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I INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine the main challenges in promoting an effective
market economy.  While the paper ranges widely across the spectrum
of economic institutions and policies, the central theme is the
importance of macroeconomic stability for economic growth in the
medium and long run.  Macroeconomic stability may be seen as a
public good.1  Its provision is among the essential responsibilities of the
state both in modern market economies and in economies transforming
themselves into modern market economies.  
Following this brief introduction, Section II considers four key
aspects of the economic environment of the coming decades: increasing
internationalisation; market-orientation; diminished government role;
high real interest rates.  Section III reviews the reasons why
macroeconomic stability matters for economic performance and
summarises the key empirical evidence supporting the existence of a
causal link.  Section IV deals with the design of domestic and
international policies and institutions to promote macroeconomic
stability and Section V asks how national governments and
international institutions can take advantage of the current relatively
stable global macroeconomic environment to improve medium-term
economic performance and promote long-term growth.  Section VI
concludes.  While our discussion will range broadly both theoretically
and empirically, we shall emphasise lessons for, and experience from,
countries attempting to create a market economy.
2II POLICY MAKING IN A ‘NEW’ WORLD
The economic environment within which countries, governments, firms
and households — as workers, investors and consumers — will have
to operate in the years to come has four features which are both
fundamental and strikingly different from the first decades after the
second world war.  First, economic activity is increasingly
internationalised.  Second, economic activity is increasingly market-
oriented and market-mediated.  Third, the role of government in
economic affairs is more limited, reflecting a more pragmatic and
modest view of what can be achieved through government action; and
fourth, saving and investment take place in a context of high real rates
of interest. 
Internationalisation
Internationalisation has several dimensions.  In the last two decades,
international trade has grown at an average annual rate twice that of
world GDP (6% versus 3%).  Nations and regions are therefore
increasingly open to trade in goods and services, meaning that foreign
markets account for an increasing share of domestic production and
that imports account for an increasing share of domestic expenditure.
The international mobility of financial capital has increased relentlessly
since the Sixties.  While the tight correlation between national saving
and domestic capital formation remains (and on average current
account surpluses or deficits are small relative to the flows of domestic
saving and capital formation), this link is weakening with each passing
decade.2  In addition, small net international flows of funds do not rule
out very large gross flows of funds, and for international portfolio
diversification and insurance against nation-specific shocks, gross rather
than net flows matter.3  While there remains a strong home bias in
financial portfolio composition, international diversification and risk
sharing are increasingly important for portfolio holders everywhere.
3The average daily turnover in the foreign exchange markets world-wide
is today in excess of $1 trillion4.
Enterprise is becoming increasingly ‘footloose’.  Even if corporate
headquarters do not yet easily skip over national boundaries, individual
production plants, R&D establishments and other production or
support activities relocate more and more freely in search of new
markets and the lowest cost of production and distribution.  FDI
permits the international re-allocation of bundled finance, managerial
capacity and technical know-how.
Increasing financial openness of countries has given rise to sudden
surges of capital inflows or outflows that have complicated
macroeconomic management in countries as diverse as Italy and the UK
on the one hand, and Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and the Czech
Republic on the other5.  Several sets of issues arise.  The first relates to
the causes of these capital surges.  In addition to the capital account
liberalisation measures themselves, these include domestic and external
causes.  The second concerns the consequences of  surges of capital
inflows or outflows.  Having determined the causes and consequences,
possible remedies or policy interventions can be considered.  At the
level of an individual country, these range all the way from the (re-)
imposition of administrative or tax barriers to capital inflows or
outflows and of other kinds of foreign exchange controls, to changes in
domestic financial regulation and supervision, and changes in the
conduct of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy.  At the systemic
level they include international co-operation and surveillance to
achieve a more co-ordinated set of national economic policies and to
improve the quality of national economic management.
A third aspect of growing international openness has been
increasing international labour mobility6.  Despite restrictive
immigration policies by the industrial countries, the result of increasing
levels of education and training in much of the developing world and
of steadily falling transportation and information costs has been that
the supply of young immigrants to the industrial countries has
increased.7  The ‘youth deficit’ of the industrial countries makes it
4likely that immigration will be a prominent economic, social and
political issue in the decades to come.
Finally, the international mobility of ideas, knowledge, know-
how and culture is a potent force making for change in economic,
social and political affairs.  No government striving for national
technological development will be able to stop its citizens from ‘surfing
the Web’. 
Moving in the direction of increased openness will benefit the
‘representative citizen’ of a nation provided two conditions are
satisfied.  The first is that there be no unfavourable terms of trade
effects.  If expanding trade causes a lower relative price of exports for
a large country, then the country may be able to share in the potential
global gains from the removal of obstacles to trade only if it either
imposes a(n optimal) tariff, or receives international compensatory
transfers.  Lump-sum international compensation would constitute the
global first-best solution.  The second condition that must be satisfied
in order that the average consumer benefits from enhanced openness,
is that a sufficiently rich domestic tax and subsidy set of instruments is
available to cope with scale economies and/or domestic distortions
(labour market monopoly, product market distortions, externalities)
that could interact unfavourably with increased trade or factor flows.
Even if increased openness benefits the average or representative
consumer, it may harm individuals or groups within the nation.  This is
true even when markets function efficiently.  In general, policies that
promote increasing international openness generate only potential
Pareto improvements.  Unless losers are actually compensated and
unless the compensation mechanisms themselves do not create large
distortions or inefficiencies, owners of adversely affected factors of
production can lose out.  For instance, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
reminds us that the factor of production used intensively in the import-
competing sector will be hurt when trade liberalisation results in an
expansion of the exporting sector and a contraction of the import-
competing sector.  Owners of sector-specific factors of production (or
5more generally of productive inputs whose internal mobility between
sectors is restricted) are likely to suffer capital losses if increased
openness shifts demand away from the sectors where these inputs have
been ‘sunk’.  Only if the government has a sufficiently rich arsenal of
internal redistribution instruments and compensation is actually paid,
is increased openness assured to improve the welfare of all.
The ability to impose tariffs is increasingly restricted by
international agreement and treaty.  National governments may also not
possess, or to be able to administer effectively, either the corrective tax
and regulatory instruments or the domestic redistribution instruments
to turn a potential welfare gain into an actual Pareto-improvement.
Under these conditions, a further problem associated with increasing
internationalisation is that winners and losers will often belong to
different national jurisdictions.  The new trade theories, emphasising
imperfectly competitive behaviour, product differentiation, static and
dynamic scale economies and cumulative conglomeration or
agglomeration processes, suggest that without effective international
compensation and assistance, enhanced economic integration may
make an entire nation worse off, even if it produces a potential welfare
improvement for the world as a whole.  Compensation mechanisms and
assistance are, however, generally defined and financed on a strictly
national basis.  There may be a future role for the WTO, or other
international arrangements, in addressing the international
distributional consequences of increasing economic interdependence.
One key implication of increasing internationalisation is that
change will come with greater frequency and enhanced severity.  There
will be fewer and fewer ‘non-traded’ or sheltered sectors.  There can
be no doubt of the increasing importance of the ability to react flexibly
and constructively to external change.
Another important implication of increased internationalisation
is that it creates pressure for increased investment.  Chasing an ever-
changing dynamic comparative advantage is a resource-intensive
business.  Both defensive restructuring and strategic investment in
newly emerging technologies and industries require enhanced
6accumulation of physical and human capital.  It is also essential, of
course, that there be no artificial obstacles to the flexible operation of
factor and product markets and to the reallocation of human and other
productive resources from declining to expanding sectors.  The quality
or productivity of any investment will depend on the efficiency of the
key input and product markets and on the quality of the internal
resource allocation mechanisms of enterprises, the ‘micro command
economies’ that are crucial to overall economic performance, even
though the macro command economy has been relegated to the scrap
heap of history. 
Markets and mixed economies
There is now virtually universal agreement that economic relations
among enterprises, between enterprises and consumers, workers and
owners of other productive inputs and between savers and investors are
best mediated through markets.8  This consensus is not due to the fact
that the world at large has, at last, understood the first and second
fundamental welfare theorems9 or has concluded that, in the debate
between Lange-Dobb-Lerner and von Mises-Hayek, the latter had,
belatedly, won the logical argument10.
It was the accumulation of experience with the failings of over-
ambitious government.  This arose in different places at different times
and in different ways, but the disillusion with government performance
rose particularly rapidly in the 1970s.  This was manifested politically
in the 1980s in the UK and USA with the Thatcher and Reagan
administrations.  And the most powerful evidence came from the brutal
experiment performed by history on the centrally planned economies
of East and Central Europe and of the Soviet Union (now the FSU),
which made it clear by the 1980s that central planning was incapable
of producing sustained increases in standards of living beyond relative
modest levels.  Slightly milder forms of similar experiments had been
performed at various times from the Fifties until the late Eighties in
7large numbers of Latin American countries pursuing inward-looking,
populist policies, in much of Africa, in the Middle-East, in India,
Indonesia and the Philippines (see eg Dornbusch and Edwards (eds)
(1991), Lago (1991), Thomas, Chibber, Dailami and de Melo (eds)
(1991), Easterly, Bruno, Fischer, Helpman, Liviatan and Meridor (eds)
(1991), Sachs and Larrain (1992) and Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel
(eds) (1994); for the post-Communist experience of some transition
economies see Balcerowicz (1993, 1994)).  The experience of Chinese
agriculture in the period 1979—83 provides a huge example of the
dramatic increase in productivity, from some basic (and no doubt
imperfect) reforms that tied private effort to private reward.11
This consensus in favour of markets coexists with a much greater
degree of understanding of the prevalence and significance of market
failure (and of its causes, consequences and cures).  The reconciliation
of these two prima facie contradictory insights comes from recognising
that not every market failure has a non-market cure and that the very
same conditions making for market failure often make for government
failure also.
To agree on the superiority of markets over central planning does
not, however, end the debate over the role of government.  First,
‘markets’ can mean many different things, from Hong-Kong neo-
liberalism via American corporate capitalism and the West-European
social market economy to the large oligopolies of Japan and Korea.
Second, without effective government there can be no effective
market system.  The government will always have a substantial role in
setting and enforcing the rules of the market game and in regulating
economic activity in general.  It is self-evident that government
influences the nature of the market system in many ways: from the
nature and quality of the legal system and the courts, through
competition policy, regulation, and public procurement to the
provision of a stable currency.  Even holding constant these
institutional and microeconomic functions of the government, the
operation of a market economy is influenced powerfully by the
government’s fiscal, financial and monetary actions and rules.  Fiscal
8policy has long-run real effects on after-tax real interest rates and the
real exchange rate.  It also has transitional effects on the degree of
capacity utilisation and the rate of unemployment.  Monetary policy
influences real interest rates in the short run, nominal interest rates in
the short run and in the long run, and the rate of inflation in the
medium and long run.  Government borrowing in the domestic financial
markets ‘crowds out’ domestic investment and other interest-sensitive
private expenditure, unless the domestic financial markets are perfectly
integrated with the world market and the country in question is small.
Unsustainable fiscal-financial-monetary policies lead to high and
volatile inflation and impair the efficient functioning of the price
mechanism.  They also tend to be regressive, both while they are
allowed to fester and when, ultimately, painful corrective measures
have to be imposed to restore solvency and sustainability.
Governments therefore influence (and often set) the rules under which
markets operate.  They also, as major purchasers or sellers in a broad
range of markets for goods, factors and financial instruments, influence
prices and transactions volumes in these markets.  Finally, through the
tax-transfer and subsidy mechanisms, a government indirectly
influences the behaviour of private transactors even in those markets
where it does not operate as a buyer or seller itself.  Even the most
market-oriented economic systems are therefore mixed economies. 
In areas of direct activity (public sector employment, the
provision of public goods and services and redistributive spending) as
well as in the financing of these and other activities, the role of the
government will and should not be negligible.  
The size of the government sector
Attempts to influence the size of government, conventionally measured
by spending or revenues as a fraction of GDP, often have negligible
effect.  This observation is underlined by the fact that after 16 years of
Conservative administrations (from 1979) in the UK, the general
9government in the fiscal year 1994/5 still spent the equivalent of 43%
of GDP and raised 37% of GDP in revenues (35% of GDP in taxes).
The corresponding figures for 1979 were 41% of GDP for general
government spending and 38% of GDP for revenues.  While these
figures do not support the conclusion that the political complexion of
the government makes no difference to the size of the government
sector, they do support the conclusion that it is very hard indeed to
achieve lasting, sustainable reductions in the size of the public sector.
The decline of government revenues in some early transition
economies
The question of the appropriate size of the government confronts
different countries in very different ways, depending on initial
conditions, economic structure and a host of internal and external
political and economic circumstances.  The determination of the level
of current revenues required to finance, without undue recourse to the
inflation tax, the minimal level of public expenditure required to
discharge the irreducible roles of the state and to sustain political and
social cohesion, is a rather imprecise and subjective science.  A case
can nevertheless be made that, in a number of transition countries in
the earlier stages of transition and that have not yet succeeded in
achieving macroeconomic stabilisation, government revenues are falling
to dangerously low levels.
The conceptual and measurement problems in characterising pre-
transition revenues are severe but they were surely of the order of 60%
of GDP or higher.12  While the transition, of its essence, should involve
a reduction in revenue and expenditure, the fall in revenue has been far
more rapid than that of expenditure, leading to the problems of
rampant inflation that these countries have faced.13  For aggregate
general government post-transition revenues for some countries from
the former Soviet Union, see Table 1.14  In some countries the revenues
10
are falling to levels which threaten the functioning of even the barest
‘night watchmen’ duties of the state and a key priority of the state
under such circumstances is to strengthen its revenue base and improve
the tax collection effort.
The decline in revenues can be attributed in part to a decline in
the traditional tax bases and in part to a decline in the government’s
ability to extract revenue from any given base.  The decline in the
traditional tax bases, mainly taxes on turnover and enterprise profits,
mirrors the sharp decline in output that has occurred, without
exception, in the early years of the transition.  In several of the East
European countries the cumulative (measured) output decline over the
period 1990—1992 ranged between 20% and 40%.
Equally important has been the weakening of the government’s
institutional and administrative capacity for collecting such key
traditional revenues as the business profits tax.  Under central planning,
the tax on state enterprise profits was effectively a business withholding
tax.  With the government setting input and output prices, the tax
authorities had direct knowledge of and access to state enterprise
profits.  Transferring these profits to the centre was essentially a simple
accounting transaction.  The unified (‘mono-bank’) banking system
further facilitated tax collection by centralising relevant information.
Privatisation of state enterprises, the break-up of the old mono-bank
system, private banking sector and price liberalisation made for a
dramatic reduction in the quantity and quality of the information
available to the centre concerning of the former state enterprises and
worsened the administrative capacity of the state for transferring
revenue from the enterprises to the centre.  
It remains a serious challenge in virtually all transition economies
that much of the new private sector falls outside the net of the
enterprise profit tax altogether.  Tax compliance is generally poor.
Avoidance and evasion are rife.  The difficulties are not confined to
profits taxes.  The rise of the private sector in retail and administration
increases the difficulty in collecting the sales and turnover taxes.
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The common tolerance for poor tax compliance is boosted by the
frequently arbitrary nature of assessments and by the many distortions
in the tax system that make for inefficiencies and inequities.  For
instance, high inflation in Poland in 1990 (586% per annum),
combined with historic cost accounting and the taxation of inventory-
valuation profits, meant that accounting profits for tax purposes wildly
overstated true profits (measured, say, on a cash-flow basis).  This
provided the government with a (strictly temporary) revenue boost and
saddled the enterprise sector with a sometimes crippling tax burden.
The next year, inflation declined (to 70% at an annual rate) and with
it the revenues from the enterprise profit tax disappeared (see Schaffer
(1992)). 
This collapse of the ability to collect taxes is not confined to the
transition economies of Eastern Europe and the FSU.  In China (an
admittedly rather unique kind of ‘transition economy’), local and
national government tax revenues were around 9% of GDP (according
to an estimate in the Wall Street Journal15) or 12% of GDP (according
to an internal IMF estimate) in 1994, compared with 31% in 1978
when market reforms began to be introduced.
The seriousness of the problems that arise when the central
government cannot secure adequate revenues to perform its essential
functions becomes apparent when we consider the history of the
demise of the former Yugoslav Republic.  The refusal of some of the
key Republics to adequately fund the Federal government, and the
inability of the Federal government to raise revenues in recalcitrant
republics without their co-operation, was a key element in the death of
the Federal state.  While there doubtlessly was two-way causation
between the disintegration of the state and the collapse of the
government’s ability to tax, the conclusion that the ability to raise
adequate revenues is a defining characteristic of any viable state is
surely robust.
That is the bad news.  The good news is that it is not impossible
to extract the resources required for an effective functioning of the
general government without excessive distortions, without excessive
12
recourse to the inflation tax, without harming growth and without
violating common standards of equity.  Both economic theory and
practical experience support this assertion.  There is now, in addition
to the reservoir of theoretical knowledge and practical experience with
the design and administration of tax systems in advanced industrial
countries, a growing body of knowledge on the special problems and
issues associated with designing and administering an effective tax
system in developing countries (surveyed eg in Newbery and Stern
(1987) and in Burgess and Stern (1993), World Bank (1991a)) and in
transition economies and countries in post-chaos/post conflict
situations (see eg Gil Díaz (1987), Bagchi, Bird and Dasgupta (1995),
IMF (1995a), and Tanzi (1992, 1993)).
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The responsibilities of government in the market economy16 
That the size of government should not be negligible becomes evident
when we think more systematically about the essential tasks of
government in a market economy.  This will also highlight the fact that
the importance of government is not captured well by its share of
employment or GDP, by the magnitude of its total spending programme
or by the revenues it raises.  The key issue (and problem) is the
integration and harmonisation of the functions of government and
market, recognising their essential complementarity.
The continued presence of a sizeable government sector even in
the most market-oriented economic systems should, per se, neither
surprise nor worry us.  However, before any task is assigned to the
government, it must be established exactly what it is that government
can do that the private sector cannot, or not as well.  As a rule it makes
sense to be sceptical (or at any rate questioning) whenever policies or
interventions are advocated whose success depends crucially on the
government having better information, superior motivation or
management capability, or higher moral standards than the private
sector.  To state this is not to take a cynical view of the motivation of
those engaged in public service.  For instance, it does not attribute a
greater tendency to self-serving behaviour to public servants than to the
public at large.  All it does is put a question mark behind the automatic
assumption of sustained disinterested behaviour by public servants.
There are, of course, many examples of individual public servants and
even of groups of civil servants who have been engaged in disinterested
sustained efforts in the pursuit of some widely accepted notion of the
common good.  It is hard to explain in any other way the success of the
National Health Service in the UK (at least before the Thatcher
reforms) and the, in many ways, remarkable performance of the fire
services in that same country.  It is also clear, however, that a public
service that relies overwhelmingly and exclusively on the sense of civic
duty of its employees, or on ‘moral incentives’ generally, is bound to
be vulnerable and fragile.  When the opportunities for private gain at
14
public expense, whether through still-legal rent seeking behaviour or
through outright corruption, become too attractive, and the pressures
for private enrichment mount, the odds lengthen against the public
servant and the public sector serving the public good.
We should never lose sight of the inescapable agency problems
that crop up whenever a task is assigned on behalf of a principal (the
citizens) to an agent (the government) whose interests and objectives
need not be coincident with those of the principal.  The individuals,
groups and agencies that are charged with performing the functions of
the state have their own agendas, possess insider (private) information
and cannot be monitored continuously and closely.  The omnipotent
and benevolent social planner of normative economics has no more
reality than the benevolent unaided invisible hand of libertarian lore.
It is therefore advisable, just to give one example, not to encumber the
administration of the state with the task of picking winners among firms
or industries.  More generally, it is difficult to make a case for an
entrepreneurial role for the state.  
A prominent structuralist thinker like Albert Hirschman (1981),
eloquently illustrates government failure in the following way:
In Latin America, new, more difficult tasks were continuously
presented to the state and society, whether or not the previous tasks
had been successfully disposed of.  Indeed it almost seemed that the
less satisfactorily a previous task had been grappled with, the greater
was the jump in difficulty of the new task and the sooner it was
introduced.  (p.122)
What makes the public sector unique is that the state has the
monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the sense that it, uniquely,
has the power to prescribe or to proscribe actions by physical or legal
persons.  There is an argument, therefore, that the state should act
when the solution to a problem requires the involvement of an agent
with the power to compel the behaviour of others because voluntary
exchange or bargaining is not sufficient to arrive at efficient or
equitable outcomes.
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In societies governed by the rule of law, the government’s
monopoly of the legitimate use of force — its power to coerce — is
reflected in the following three competencies: (1) the power to tax, that
is, the power to extract payment without a quid pro quo; (2) the power
to legislate and to enforce, that is, to prescribe or proscribe behaviour,
and (3) the power to declare one or more of its liabilities to be legal
tender.  In view of this, a minimalist view of the role of the state could
hold that unless the solution of a problem requires at least one of these
three competencies, there is no prima facie reason for the state to get
involved, and, from this perspective, the burden of proof falls on those
advocating a role for the state.
Arguments for a more encompassing role for the state in economic
affairs (and in the life of the polity in general) often start from a more
organic view of the state and a less dichotomous view of the
relationship between state and individual than has been maintained in
the discussion thus far.
The state, the individual (or the family, or the household) and the
commercial enterprise are connected through the web of ‘civil society’:
the nexus of myriads of voluntary associations and organisations that
influence virtually every aspect of our personal and professional or
business lives.  They include temples, churches, mosques and
synagogues, political parties, trades unions, professional associations,
NGOs of all descriptions, lobbies for all number of causes and
interests, charitable and other not-for-profit organisations, sports clubs,
the temperance movement, neighbourhood watch, consumer
associations, citizen’s advice bureaux, ombudsmen, the boy scouts, the
extended family and many others.  Clearly, it is often hard to determine
with any degree of precision where the state ends and civil society
begins.  To take the UK as an example, where do Quangos (quasi-
autonomous non-government organisations) belong, such as the Arts
Council and the various regulatory bodies that have been created as
privatisation has gathered pace since 1979?  Where do we put the
National Lottery and its regulatory body?  What of the Church of
England and other ‘established’ or state churches?  Theocracies the
16
world over and throughout history have denied the relevance of the
distinction between church and state.  When we think of the state and
the individual not as a simple dichotomy but merely as the two
extremes on a continuum of modes of association and social
interaction, the model of a minimalist state is less likely to recommend
itself.
It is also true that the state can bring together or unify its citizens
and focus them on particular issues or activities without any direct or
overt use of the three competencies mentioned above.  Often, but by no
means always, the state is identified with a nation and the nation with
a culture.  This makes the state a natural guardian or custodian of that
culture (and of the nation), a role that brings with it a range of duties,
tasks and obligations.  An open question remains, however, as to the
extent to which this role of the state as a natural national focal point is,
ultimately, derived from its power to coerce.  
Whatever one’s view on the appropriate tasks to be performed by
the government, it is evident that there have been (and continue to be)
important differences in the effectiveness with which governments in
different countries, with distinct cultures and varied histories, discharge
very similar tasks.  It is important to try to learn from the more
successful government bureaucracies and to determine to what extent
superior organisation and practice are culturally and historically
transferable.
It is probably non-controversial to assert that there is no prima
facie case for the government as a producer of pure private (rival and
excludable) goods and services that do not give rise to external effects.
Examples include cars, bread, electricity, coal and steel.  Even with
‘impure’ private goods or with partial or even pure public goods, the
case for public provision (production and distribution) is often weak,
although a prima facie case for some government intervention (eg
through direct purchasing subsidisation, taxation or regulation) may
exist.  For example, in the case of non-rival but excludable goods
(video and audio signals transmitted via satellite but subject to
scrambling at little cost), provision by properly regulated private
17
suppliers is likely to be more efficient than public provision.  Natural
monopolies (for example, rail track, electricity transmission grids, water
distribution, sewage collection through pipes) call for state
intervention.  The optimal form of intervention may well be private
ownership and operation with subsidisation and regulation rather than
state ownership and public management.  The choice may vary within
an industry (an electricity transmission grid may be publicly owned,
whereas much generation may be private) and across industries most
telecommunications may be private (but subject to regulation).  
Public sector production need of course involve no element of
subsidisation at all.  There are many examples of profitable state
enterprises that make a net financial contribution to general
government sector, either through the ordinary tax mechanism or
through direct transfers of part of their surplus to the exchequer.  Two
special problems faced by public sector producers are the weakness
(sometimes the absence) of incentives for cost minimisation and the
special problems of political pressures on public sector pricing.  When
prices are set directly by the government, they are likely to become the
subject of popular discontent (as in the case of food prices) or of
lobbying by sectional interests (as in the case of the water and
electricity prices paid by agricultural producers).  Of course, such
pressures do not disappear if production is private and prices are
market-determined.  Instead they are transformed into calls for
subsidies and other forms of assistance.  Nevertheless,  calls for
intervention through subsidies in a reasonably transparent market are
likely to be easier to resist than calls for favourable public sector
pricing decisions when the government is the market.
Pressures for containing costs in public sector producers are likely
to be more effective when the public producer operates in a competitive
market environment for which a regulator or overseer can establish
reasonably objective yardsticks for costs and rates of return (see
Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991)).  While this is not enough to
establish the desirability of public sector production, it does provide a
way of improving public sector performance.
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The upshot is that in a well-functioning market economy, one
would expect to see only a small non-financial state enterprise sector
and a financial state sector restricted to little more than the central
bank.  The productive role of the general government sector would
include intermediate public goods and services such as public
administration, defence and law and order17 and investing resources to
maintain or expand its future capacity to provide these intermediate
public goods and services.  For these intermediate public goods and
services, ‘contracting out’ does not seem like an attractive option.  Law
and order and national security are examples.  Private justice (‘the best
judges money can buy’) is unlikely to be an idea whose time has come.
Defence is an intermediate public good where private provision is
unlikely to dominate public provision.  A final example, and one that
will be discussed at greater length in Sections III and IV, is the public
intermediate good of macroeconomic stability.
When it comes to other activities currently performed by the
general government sector, the distinction again becomes relevant
between the government funding or subsidising certain goods or
activities and the government providing goods and services themselves.
There are good efficiency, distributional and merit good arguments
(discussed at greater length below) for the government funding (partly
or wholly) or subsidising education, health care, child protection, drug
rehabilitation, the arts and the collection and treatment of garbage,
sewage, and so on.  These arguments do not, however, necessarily
imply that these services have to be provided (produced and
distributed) by the public sector.  We may wish to subsidise the arts
and education, but there is no automatic reason why the members of
the symphony orchestra or of the teaching profession should be public
servants. 
The minimum irreducible tasks of government in a modern market
economy and during the transition to a modern market economy
include the following.  Note that the arguments for government
intervention include, but are not restricted to, the familiar triad, based
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on standard microeconomic welfare economics of (1) enforcing the
rules of the game, (2) market failure and (3) distribution18:
(i)  Guarantee the rule of law and the internal (law and order) and
external (defence) security of persons and property. 
(ii)  Correct market failure.  This (Pigovian) function of the
government consists in attempting to correct, through taxes, subsidies
and regulation, those inefficiencies and forms of market failure that
cannot, because of transactions costs such as asymmetric information,
be internalised and negotiated away through private (Coase) bargains.
These inefficiencies and market failures can be due eg to externalities,
missing markets, abuse of market power and other forms of non-
competitive behaviour, increasing returns, public goods and imperfect
information.  It is important not to be overambitious: in many instances
of market failure, government failure is also likely.  This is often the
case when informational problems (especially those resulting in moral
hazard) are the cause of the market failure.  Economists of the ‘public
choice’ school go further and assert that government itself is an
important cause of inefficiency and market failure because politicians
and civil servants have considerable discretion to pursue private
sectional interests that are likely to be at odds with any reasonable
notion of the common good, and use this discretion to interfere with
the efficient functioning of markets in order to extract private rents.
(iii) Pursue distributional objectives that are not met through
voluntary private redistribution, within and across generations, using
taxes, transfer payments, spending programs, regulation and other
administrative measures.  These include the prevention, elimination or
reduction of poverty and can also include a wider concern with the
distribution of income.  Why would individuals be unwilling or unable
to voluntarily redistribute income between social groups (or
generations-see point (iv) below) and at the same time ask the
government to do so?  Part of the answer is that government helps solve
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the ‘free rider problem’ of redistribution in communities with large
numbers of potential contributors and recipients.  While I might be
willing to pay to prevent poverty elsewhere, I would probably prefer to
have someone else pay for it.  Purely voluntary contributions could be
depressed below the socially optimal level if distributional preferences
and willingness to pay can be dissimulated.  Notions of fairness, of
shared burdens, also are likely to play a role.  Once compulsion19
becomes part of the efficient redistributional mechanism, a role for the
state in redistribution cannot be avoided.  Once we move beyond the
scale of small local communities with direct face-to-face contact,
monitoring and enforcement, redistribution is also subject to economies
of scope, scale and co-ordination.  While any redistributional
monopoly might do in principle, the state seems an obvious choice,
although other institutions, such as the church, have in the past
assumed many of the distributional functions today exercised by the
state. 
(iv) Enforcing the rights of future generations is a further item on the
government’s distributional agenda.  These distributional issues are
often tied up with efficiency questions, including the inter-generational
transmission of environmental externalities.
(v) Give expression to legitimate paternalism, by subsidising the
provision of ‘merit goods’ like education, or through policies affecting
pensions, health insurance and drugs.  
(vi) Alternatively such policies can be seen as the government asserting
and enforcing the rights of some or all citizens to certain facilities or
goods such as education, health and housing.
(vii)  Finance public spending in a non-distortionary and
equitable manner.
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The relative space given to these items in our discussion should not be
seen as an indication of our judgement of any ranking of their
importance.  Our concern here is mainly with macroeconomic issues
and thus with factors influencing levels of taxation and expenditure
rather than with the details of its composition.
High global real interest rates
Real interest rates in the industrial world have been higher in the
period since the early 1980s than in any interval of a decade or longer
since 1850.  Table 2 makes two key points.  First, it shows just how
unprecedented is the 5.1% level of real interest rates achieved on
average in the US, Japan, Germany and the UK over the period 1981-
93.  Second, the ‘Keynesian era’ from about 1945 till the end of the
seventies was one of historically low real interest rates, not only when
compared with the 1980s and 1990s, but also when compared with the
period 1850 till 1929.
The pattern observed for the real interest rate is also present for
the excess of the real interest rate over the growth rate of real GDP,
which, for the average for the USA, Germany, France and the UK, is
negative from 1933 till about 1980, but rises to 3.0% for the period
1981—1983.  During the first three years of the Great Depression
(1929—32) steep declines in the general price level turned fairly high
nominal interest rates into very high ex-post real interest rates.  The
associated painful process of debt deflation was described accurately
by contemporary observers like Irving Fisher (Fisher (1932)).  With real
GDP collapsing, the excess of the real interest rate over the growth rate
is extremely high during the first three years of the Great Depression.
From 1933 on, the industrial world can be seen to enter the
‘Keynesian era’, in which real interest rates are low both historically
and compared to the growth rate of real GDP.  With the interest rate
persistently (if not generally) below the growth rate, the government
solvency constraint fails to have any short- or medium-term relevance:
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it is not necessary to generate future primary surpluses or future
seigniorage in order to service the outstanding stock of public debt, no
matter how high the debt-GDP ratio is!20 
From the budget constraint of the consolidated general
government and central bank (henceforth the government), it follows
that the change in the government debt-GDP ratio over some period is
the sum of two components.  The first, representing the ‘intrinsic’ debt-
GDP dynamics, equals the debt-GDP ratio at the beginning of that
period, times the excess of the real interest rate over the growth rate of
real GDP during that period.  It shows whether the cost of meeting that
period’s contractual interest obligations exceeds or falls short of the
growth in the government’s ability to service the debt.  The second
component represents the ‘discretionary’ component of the increase in
the debt-GDP ratio.  It is the government sector’s primary (non-
interest) deficit as a fraction of GDP, minus seigniorage (new issues of
government base money) as a fraction of GDP.21
For example, ignoring seigniorage, the debt-GDP ratio will come
down when real GDP growth exceeds the real rate of interest, as long
as the primary deficit is smaller than the outstanding stock of debt times
the excess of the growth rate over the rate of interest22.  Table 2 makes
it clear that the days of deficit financing without pain are gone.  With
real interest rates above the real growth rate in all but a handful of very
fast growing economies, the government solvency constraint has
become a real, binding constraint on the ability of governments to
pursue spending objectives, whatever their motivation.  In the same
way, the national solvency constraint too became binding in a very
visible and tangible way for a large number of highly indebted
developing countries during 1981/82.
In the long run, in a financially closed economic system (eg the
world economy as a whole), the real rate of interest balances planned
saving and planned investment.  In the short run, monetary policy may
have a powerful impact on the real interest rate because of the presence
of nominal price and wage rigidities.  Also in the short run, variations
in the level of economic activity may, through the Keynesian multiplier
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mechanism, balance planned saving and planned investment at rates of
unemployment and capacity utilisation that can depart significantly
from their ‘natural’ levels.  Abstracting from these short-run, cyclical
considerations, the real interest rate in a financially closed system is, in
the long run, government by the classical forces of thrift and
productivity.  A financially open economy can pay for an excess of
domestic capital formation over national saving by running an external
current account deficit, that is, by borrowing from abroad; it can
dispose of an excess of national saving over domestic capital formation
by running an external current account surplus, that is, by investing
abroad.
High and/or rising equilibrium real interest rates need not
automatically be a cause for concern.  It all depends on what causes
them.23  There are ‘good news’ increases in the real rate of interest,
reflecting buoyant investment demand outstripping even a robust and
healthy saving performance.  There also are ‘bad news’ increases in the
real rate of interest, reflecting a disappointing and inadequate saving
effort choking off a not necessarily spectacular investment performance.
The increase in the real rate of interest since 1980 would appear
to be mainly a ‘bad news’ increase, reflecting a worsening in the saving
performance of the industrial countries other than Japan, rather than a
booming world demand for capital investment24. 
We do not anticipate that, in a properly managed world economy,
the demand for capital by the industrial world would decline in the
years and decades to come.  If the benefits from increased global
economic integration are to be widely shared by workers, owners of
capital and consumers in the industrial world, significant restructuring
will have to take place in the industrial countries.  As noted already,
both defensive and strategic restructuring require capital formation,
broadly defined.  If the New Industrial Countries are to continue on the
successful road trod by a number of South East Asian and more
recently by some Latin American countries, their demands for capital
are also bound to remain buoyant.  Successful completion of the
transition in Eastern Europe and the FSU will require a substantial
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physical capital formation in these countries, given the prevailing
imbalance between the high quality of the human capital and the often
decrepit state of much of the industrial capital stock and of the physical
infrastructure.  If the hitherto unsuccessful developing countries are to
join the community of fast growing nations, they too will have to
experience a significant increase in their capital formation rates (both
physical and human).  And the two largest countries in the world,
China and India, are following ambitious programmes involving rapid
growth, liberalisation and restructuring which are likely to require high
investment.
Realising the legitimate ambitions of a growing world population
for a sustained and high growth rate in standards of living is likely to
require a significant increase in the global rate of capital formation.
Unless there is a matching increase in the global saving rate, the ex-post
reconciliation of ex-ante inconsistent investment and saving plans will
occur through high real interest rates crowding out capital formation.
While some contribution to this required increase in the global
saving rate can come from the transition economies and the developing
countries, the only realistic source of major additional saving is the
industrial world, at least in the next decade or so.  
Saving behaviour in the transition economies is likely to be
subject to a number of influences pulling in different directions.  Under
the previous (communist) regime there was a pervasive socialisation of
risks, with the government guaranteeing employment (thus eliminating
(open) unemployment risk) and fully funding (and providing) health
care and disability compensation.  With the collapse of communism,
households are faced for the first time with the risk of unemployment,
with low and time-limited unemployment compensation and with
reduced public provision and financing of health care and disability
compensation.  The need for private provision to cope with these risks
therefore arises, with clear implications for saving behaviour25.  With
incomplete risk markets, the accumulation of a stock of liquid financial
assets provides a (second-best) way of providing for a rainy day
(purchasing rainy day insurance would be first-best).  Such
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‘precautionary’ saving behaviour has been shown to be quantitatively
significant in the industrial countries, and there is no reason to believe
things are any different in the transition economies.26
This would in part be reflected, in the transition economies, in
attempts to build up the ratio of financial wealth to income.  Given the
highly imperfect financial and capital markets faced by private savers
in transition economies, and a wish to provide for retirement, there is
likely to be a perceived need to restore the financial wealth/income
ratio to more prudent levels than those inherited from the early
transition phase.  Note that under communism, private financial wealth
(which consisted mainly of foreign and domestic cash holdings and
bank deposits) was already very low in relation to income, and that
much of the financial wealth was destroyed in the near-hyperinflations
of the first phase of the transition.  With the growth of the market
economy we should expect a significant build-up of private financial
wealth (including equity in residential housing) toward levels (in
relation to income) typical of the industrial market economies.  Such
stock-correction effects may well be significant.
With a relatively unsophisticated financial sector, it is often
impossible for households to borrow in order to acquire the funds to
make the minimal downpayment for a housing purchase or for the
purchase of some other big-ticket consumer durable.  The inability to
collateralise these consumer assets and the limited domain of secure
transactions generally mean that households will have to save for some
time prior to a planned ‘lumpy’ or indivisible durable purchase in order
to build up the liquid balances necessary to make the down payments.
Improvement in the collateraliseability of real estate and moveable
property reduces the need to save up prior to making durable
purchases.  Thus the elimination (or mitigation) of a capital market
imperfection could lead to a reduction in the saving rate.
Against these can be set a negative effect of successful transition
and structural adjustment on the saving rate, likely to come through the
‘permanent vs current income’ channel.  The mechanism is that a
higher anticipated growth rate of future real income will raise
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permanent income above current income.  For standard life-
cycle/permanent income reasons this would depress private saving
rates.  Another way in which successful transition, stabilisation or
structural adjustment affect private saving rates is through the reduction
in the volatility and uncertainty concerning future income streams that
it engenders.  This will tend to lower precautionary savings.
Demographic developments differ greatly between the ‘youth-
deficit’ countries of EE and the European parts of the FSU and some
of the Islamic FSU countries.  The saving implications of these
demographic differences are likely to be important in the former group
and they are likely to limit possibilities for raising saving.
On balance, it seems likely that socially desirable investment
programmes in NICs, developing countries and transition economies
will outstrip these countries’ domestic saving capacities.  Significant
and persistent current account deficits for the aggregate of the non-
industrial world will therefore have to be financed by an excess of
industrial country saving over industrial country domestic capital
formation.  If an appropriate industrial country full-employment
current account surplus fails to materialise, one of two things will
happen.  Either financial autarky will be imposed on the would-be
capital importers through higher real interest rates and international
credit rationing, or a recession in the industrial countries will weaken
their investment demand to such an extent that the low-employment
current account surpluses of the industrial countries can fund the
financial deficit of the rest of the world.  Both these scenarios are
unattractive.  It is up to the industrial countries to accomplish the
OECD-wide switch in the monetary-fiscal policy mix, towards a more
restrictive budgetary stance and a more expansionary monetary stance,
that is necessary if the industrial world is to generate larger full-
employment current account surpluses.
Given the mixed prospects for savings behaviour in the transition
economies and in the developing countries in the absence of policies
specifically designed to raise national saving rates, what are the
available policy options?  Past research has not documented any
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significant sensitivity of aggregate private saving to its real after-tax rate
of return.  If this empirical regularity continues to hold, we must be
looking either for policy changes or other exogenous events that raise
public saving without a corresponding reduction in private saving or for
developments that shift the private saving function, that is, raise the
amount saved by the private sector at any given rate of return, for a
given level of public saving.  A number of policy options (most of
which can be applied throughout the world), are considered in Section
V below.
III THE IMPORTANCE OF MACROECONOMIC
STABILITY
Macroeconomic stability is an intermediate public good whose
provision cannot be contracted out to the private sector.  Not only is its
financing the natural province of the state, producing or providing it is
one of the inescapable responsibilities of national governments and
international agencies and institutions.
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Macroeconomic stability — causes, consequences and cures
Macroeconomic stability matters because uncertainty impairs economic
performance across the board.  Macroeconomic instability contributes
significantly to the uncertainty faced by enterprises and households (as
workers, as savers/portfolio holders and as consumers).  Elsewhere we
have written at length about macroeconomic instability—its causes,
costs and cures (see Buiter, Lago and Stern (1995)) — so we shall we
relatively brief here.  In examining the costs of avoidable
macroeconomic instability, it is necessary to consider the implications
of loss of control, the damage inflicted by corrective stabilisation policy
measures necessitated by prior loss of control and the cost of policy
actions intended to forestall future loss of control.  All IFIs have an
interest in these issues.  Several of them, such as the IMF and the
World Bank, play an important role in macroeconomic adjustment
programmes for individual countries.  Others, such as the WTO and its
predecessor the GATT (and also the IMF), play a key role in designing,
monitoring and enforcing international rules of conduct that can reduce
the risk of negative-sum national policies being adopted by member
states.
There are two distinct kinds of macroeconomic instability that can
have a major impact on microeconomic performance.  The first
concerns global systemic failure and the ensuing collapse of effective
demand and economic activity.  The Great Depression of the Thirties
is the prime example of such a catastrophic development.  Fortunately,
such systemic co-ordination failure is as rare as it is serious.  In our
view, both globally — through institutions like the IMF, the BIS, the
G-7 or the OECD — and at the regional and national levels — through
multilateral agencies, national governments and central banks — the
knowledge and the means are, in principle, present to cope with this
particular contingency.  Even in the absence of cataclysmic global
economic disaster, there is a role for international policy co-ordination
and co-operation to internalise the international spillovers from
national macroeconomic policies.  Exchange rate surveillance, as
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practised by the IMF is one expression of this recognition of
interdependence and co-dependence.  The collective monitoring of the
performance of EU member states vis-à-vis the Maastricht convergence
criteria (for inflation rate, interest rates, the exchange rate, public debt
and public deficits) is another example of a collective institutional
response to the perception of spillovers and international externalities.
The debt crisis of the 1980s provides another example of a systemic
macroeconomic problem.  Its origins can be traced to national
macroeconomic mismanagement, both in the creditor countries of the
industrial world and in the indebted developing countries, following
the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the resulting need to
‘recycle’ the current account surpluses of the oil exporting countries.
International financial markets, commercial banks, national economic
policy makers and some of the IFIs overestimated the extent to which
the low (ex-post) real interest rates of the seventies would persist into
the future and underestimated the likelihood of sovereign default.
The second kind of macroeconomic instability concerns
unsustainable fiscal, financial and monetary policy programmes.  It
often manifests itself through outright inflationary financing or else
through a significant rise in the public debt-GDP ratio without a
commensurate increase in the government’s capacity for generating
sufficient future primary (non-interest) budget surpluses.  The
‘technocratic’ costs of achieving and maintaining macroeconomic
stability are probably not very high — just the salaries of the (non-
corrupt) central bank and Treasury officials in charge of the design and
implementation of macroeconomic policy.  The political costs of
eliminating the real resource appropriation patterns associated with
high inflation and non-transparent budgetary and quasi-budgetary
procedures represent the real obstacles to change.  High and rising
inflation, occasionally even exploding into hyperinflation, results when
domestic and international markets are unwilling to absorb monetary
or non-monetary debt in quantities sufficient to finance the
government’s budget deficit in a non-inflationary manner.  
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Moreover, as the Mexican crisis of 1994—95 shows, high inflation
can also be the ultimate outcome of a sequence of events that starts
with an unsustainable increase in externally financed private sector
spending and culminates in a banking and foreign exchange crisis with
large private losses which eventually lead to government budget deficits
or quasi-fiscal deficits if these losses are subsequently underwritten
(wholly or in part), by the public sector.  The anticipation of the
likelihood of an eventual public sector bail-out of course helps make
this chain of events more likely.  Improved supervision of domestic
financial institutions (especially banks), a credible commitment not to
bail out domestic or foreign investors and financial institutions, and
controls on capital inflows, are the only policy options capable of
forestalling such crises. 
Increased recourse to the inflation tax in the face of an otherwise
unfinanceable public sector deficit is unlikely to provide a lasting
solution to the problem of an inconsistent fiscal-financial-monetary
programme.  The amount of real resources that can be appropriated
through the ‘inflation tax’ is limited and will ultimately decrease when
the rate of inflation becomes sufficiently high27.  This ‘seigniorage
Laffer curve’ reflects both direct international currency substitution
(away from the local currency and towards hard currencies) and a shift
into domestic non-monetary assets that are better hedges against
inflation.  The ability to avoid the inflation tax is unequally distributed:
the inflation tax, in addition to being inefficient, strikes strongly at the
poor and the weak, who are less able to avoid the tax by switching their
portfolios towards domestic and foreign assets that are better hedges
against inflation.  Very high inflation may furthermore increase the
primary deficit, ie the fiscal deficit excluding interest payments,
through the so-called Olivera-Tanzi effect, resulting from delays in
settling tax obligations when these are not properly indexed to inflation
or subject to an appropriate interest penalty.
When the government or the country at large are (de facto)
rationed out of the domestic and international financial markets and
when the limits of the inflation tax have been reached, a crunch is
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unavoidable.  Public and private spending will have to be slashed,
revenues will have to be increased, or there will have to be default on
outstanding debt.  Such corrections are both unavoidable and painful.
The external manifestations of retrenchment are import compression
and the shifting of production of tradable goods towards exports rather
than towards domestic absorption.  The necessary reduction in
domestic absorption typically leads, at least in the short run, to a
contraction of production and an increase in open or hidden
unemployment.  Two points must be made about the costs associated
with macroeconomic tightening.  First, it makes no sense to criticise
governments, or those IFIs that may advise them, for taking corrective
action.  The necessity to adjust arises from unsustainable policies.
Second, there always is a non-trivial domain of choice as to the
composition of the policy correction.  There is choice about which
spending categories to cut, about which taxes to raise, and about which
category of debt to default on or reschedule.  There may also be
flexibility on timing, although this will depend on the co-operation of
external agents and on the perceptions of markets.
Aggregate evidence on the relationship between macroeconomic
instability and economic growth
Over the last three decades, low or moderate inflation and reduced
macroeconomic distortions (such as over-valued official exchange
rates) have been characteristics of fast-growing economies, as can be
seen in Table 3.  Conversely, economies with a poorer growth record
have also experienced higher inflation and stronger distortions.  
Nevertheless, the time-series and cross-sectional evidence on the
relationship between macroeconomic stability, on the one hand, and
microeconomic efficiency and growth, on the other, should be
interpreted with care.  Both macroeconomic and microeconomic
performance are endogenous.  There may be no straightforward causal
interpretation of the correlation between the two or the incremental
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predictive content of the one with respect to the other.  The possibility
of two-way causation — and even of common third factors causing
both — is especially relevant at low and moderate rates of inflation.
When annual inflation begins to run in the hundreds or when monthly
inflation rates get into double digits, there can be little doubt, however,
that macroeconomic malfeasance depresses growth and lowers
allocative efficiency.  Referring to the experience of a group of very
high inflation, middle income countries, Bruno states:
The fact that growth is systematically higher after a sharp stabilisation is
consistent with the finding that very high rates of inflation are definitely
harmful to growth.  Stabilisation by itself, even before sustainable
resumption of investment and long-run growth, improves resource
allocation and total factor productivity. (Bruno, 1993) 
Support for this proposition can be found in a large number of case
studies (eg Cooper, Corden, Little and Rajapatrana (1993), Corden
(1990), Bruno, Fischer, Helpman, Liviatan and Meridor (eds) (1991)).
On the other hand, at lower rates of inflation (say 15% a year or
lower) there is less evidence of any clear pattern of covariation between
inflation and growth or between inflation and other observable indices
of efficiency, such as total factor productivity. Much of the relevant
evidence is surveyed, discussed and extended in Fischer (1991, 1993).
These conclusions are confirmed in a recent paper by Robert Barro
(Barro (1995a)), which finds that the empirical evidence from more
than 100 countries over a period of 30 years suggests that the adverse
effect of inflation on growth is clear only when inflation is high: the
estimated coefficient of growth on inflation is statistically significant
(albeit small 28) when inflation averages more than 15% per year. The
estimated coefficient of growth on inflation is not statistically
significant when inflation averages less than 15% per annum.2930 Thus,
in speaking of the damaging effects of inflation on performance, one
must be clear that it is the high rates of inflation that are at issue. 
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Macroeconomic instability and enterprises
Technology, the quantity and quality of material inputs and outputs,
and the skills of labour and management, are clearly essential to
enterprise performance.  However, the macroeconomic environment
surrounding the enterprise is no less relevant.  Comparable projects and
enterprises perform very differently in countries with differing
macroeconomic and regulatory frameworks (see eg Kaufmann (1991)
and World Bank (1991b)).  If these frameworks provide stable signals
and low transaction costs, the quality of enterprise decisions, and thus
the odds of success, improve.  Any factors influencing the cost to firms
of entering into contracts (be they implicit or explicit, market-mediated
or administratively determined, repeated or one-off, with outsiders or
with insiders) and of monitoring and enforcing them, will affect
enterprise performance.  The macroeconomic environment is an
important determinant of the transaction costs incurred among
themselves by the parties that are stakeholders in the enterprise, and by
the enterprise itself in its market-mediated transactions with other
enterprises, households and other customers or suppliers.
The mechanisms linking inflation to microeconomic performance
can be spelled out more explicitly as follows.  At a qualitative level,
the connections are reasonably well understood31.  The costs associated
with fully anticipated inflation are ‘shoe-leather’ costs (borne mainly
by households) and ‘menu costs’ 32 borne mainly by firms.  They fall
into the ‘probably true but surely unimportant’ category.  If there were
no other costs associated with inflation, no-one would be deprived of
sleep because of it.
More important is the empirical fact that high inflation tends to be
associated with (i) variable and uncertain inflation and (ii) relative price
variability and uncertainty.  The reasons for this empirical association
lie partly in the nature of private and public sector wage and price-
setting mechanisms — and more generally in the whole range of
contracting arrangements among economic agents — and partly in the
realm of political economy.  High inflation is often the ultimate
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monetary manifestation of unresolved social conflict about public
spending and its financing.  The resolution of this underlying political
and social conflict is a highly uncertain process.  Since complete
contingent markets are a theoretical abstraction, high inflation increases
the incidence of false signals, and creates confusion about the
interpretation of observed price changes.  How does one tell whether
they are permanent or transitory?  Are they relative price changes
requiring an allocative response or just the ‘local’ manifestations of an
increase in the general price level requiring no resource reallocation?
By increasing the ‘noise-to-signal ratio’ of observed price changes,
inflation therefore impairs the allocative efficiency of the price
mechanism.
Inflation (especially high and uncertain inflation) and the
anticipation of (eventual) future fiscal and monetary policy actions to
control inflation increase the uncertainty of the economic environment
within which private agents make production and investment decisions.
Future fiscal correction may directly affect business profitability if it
involves changes in taxes or subsidies.  Changes in public sector
infrastructure investment may directly impinge on future project
performance.  In addition, fiscal retrenchment will tend to be
associated with a cyclical decline in economic activity, a reduction in
employment and a depreciation of the real exchange rate (an increase
in the relative price of traded to non-trade goods), as well as with
changes in other key relative prices (eg real wages and energy prices).
Investment involves the commitment of resources today in
anticipation of future, uncertain returns.  To a greater or lesser degree
the decision is irreversible and the resources committed to investment
projects are ‘sunk’; they cannot be easily recovered or reallocated to
alternative uses if the expectations of future profits which motivated the
investment fail to materialise (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).  In other
words, when a firm installs a unit of capital today, it also acquires the
‘put’ option of reselling that unit of capital at some future date.  The
value of that ‘put’ option will be greater the higher the resale price (net
of adjustment costs) relative to the current purchase price and the
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greater the uncertainty surrounding the future returns to the investment.
From this perspective increased uncertainty depresses investment.
There are other arguments, associated with costs of expansion in
the future if plant size proves inadequate, which could point in the
direction of an expanding investment in response to greater uncertainty.
The argument is developed by Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (1995)
and is sometimes summarised as the ‘limited expandability’ effect.
Whether on balance the response of investment to increased
uncertainty is positive or negative is an empirical issue.  Regardless of
whether the investment is expanded, contracted, delayed or brought
forward, real economic performance worsens as a result of the increase
in uncertainty as the firm (and the economy) are more likely to be stuck
with excess capacity or deficient capacity.  Recent firm-level empirical
evidence for the US suggests that an increase in uncertainty depresses
investment (see Leahy and Whited (1996)).  The empirical evidence
surveyed by Pindyck and Solimano (1993) suggests that investment is
more likely to be delayed and depressed in the aftermath of
stabilisation in high inflation countries.  If the irreversibility effect
dominates the limited expandability effect, it would indeed be rational
for investors to exercise such a ‘wait and see option’ (see Dornbusch
(1990)).  Only when sufficient commitment to the reform process is
shown and a track record is established does private investment resume
strongly.  
Greater caution may therefore be the rational private sector
response to macroeconomic instability.  This is compounded by the
financial short-termism effect of high inflation.  Private markets, for
reasons that are not fully understood, often do not fully index the
capital value of long-term outstanding debt but do fully index short-
term interest rates.  In this borrowing environment loans become
inevitably very short-term.  In those circumstances the long-term
financing of investment may be impossible, borrowers are faced
continuously with the problem of rolling over their debt and the risk of
a credit crunch is ever present.
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Macroeconomic instability and households
Macroeconomic instability affects households through inflation and
through the likelihood and duration of unemployment.  Even in those
countries that have public unemployment insurance33 programmes, the
standard of living of a worker falls sharply when he or she is made
redundant.  Much of an individual’s unemployment and labour income
risk is idiosyncratic, that is, specific to the individual rather than
general.  Idiosyncratic risk is, in principle, diversifiable.  Adverse
selection and moral hazard problems are the reasons most individual
labour income and unemployment risk nevertheless cannot be insured
privately34.  Unemployment risk does have a common component,
however, reflecting economy-wide macroeconomic developments, both
cyclical and structural.  Since these aggregate or common risks cannot
be insured (although the income consequences for the unemployed can
be), economic performance can be enhanced only by minimising the
shocks that perturb the unemployment rate.  
Without subscribing to the ‘if it moves, stop it’ approach to
stabilisation policy, we accept the view that not all fluctuations in
output and employment represent Pareto-efficient fluctuations in the
natural rate of unemployment.  Both aggregate demand shocks and
aggregate supply shocks can produce (possibly persistent) deviations of
the actual unemployment rate from the natural rate and of actual
output from capacity output.  Well-designed stabilisation policy (1)
does not amplify such fluctuations through inappropriate monetary and
fiscal policy actions and (2) tries to buffer and offset, to the extent
possible, shocks producing deviations of the actual from the natural
rate originating in the domestic private sector and abroad.  At the very
least this means letting the automatic fiscal stabilisers do their work35.
Allowing for predictable endogenous fluctuations in velocity when
pursuing monetary targets or interpreting monetary indicators is another
necessary ingredient of any well-designed macroeconomic stabilisation
rule.
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Inflation affects households through a number of channels.  We
have already referred to the ‘shoeleather cost’ of anticipated inflation.
While these are likely to be negligible for low or moderate rates of
inflation, very high inflation rates can divert significant resources from
socially productive activities to privately rational, but socially
unproductive, activities such as hyperactive financial portfolio
management and rent seeking.  Typically, the financial and public
relations managers of enterprises become more senior and better paid
than the production manager.
Imperfect indexation in the public and private sectors means that
high (and uncertain) inflation is associated with major redistributions
of resources from domestic currency creditors to domestic currency
debtors and more generally from the economically weak and
unsophisticated to the economically agile and well-connected.  Since
workers’ financial portfolios in developing countries are largely
restricted to transaction cash balances, the inflation tax has been
viewed as an outright tax on wages.  The regressive nature of the
inflation tax and in general the negative effects of rising inflation on
real wages have been extensively documented in countries with chronic
high inflation such as Argentina and Brazil (see for example Cardoso
(1992) and Cardoso et al (1995)).  A recent study for Brazil, Kane and
Morisett (1993) shows, using disaggregated data by income strata, that
high inflation hurts the lower and middle classes far more than the
upper quintile of the population, who manage to insulate themselves
from its effects by taking advantage of high real interest rates and from
better — less imperfect — indexation devices to shelter their incomes.
Open inflation is neither the only manifestation of macroeconomic
instability nor the only macroeconomic evil distorting enterprise
decision-making and performance.  The underlying and fundamental
problem is the sustainability of fiscal and financial policies.
Frequently, governments are able to ‘repress’ inflation for a while by
borrowing heavily, mostly internationally.  As Corden (1990) has
emphasised, for a given budget deficit, governments often confront a
short-run trade-off between monetary financing and external borrowing
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(ie a trade-off between inflation and the current account deficit).  If
external finance is available, the inflationary impact of a given budget
deficit can be temporarily ‘repressed’ by letting the exchange rate
become overvalued.  This strategy, however, may eventually lead to a
foreign exchange crisis — and to the introduction of foreign exchange
controls and/or outright default — and thus to a sharp adjustment of
the nominal and real exchange rate and subsequent high inflation.
Many of the enterprise decisions — predicated upon the relative prices
and rules prevailing prior to the crisis — may have translated into
investments and production processes that are no longer financially
viable after the crunch.  The resulting sunk investment costs impose
heavy dead-weight losses on society.
Countries prone to social conflict and macroeconomic instability
often embark on stabilisation attempts which they subsequently
abandon following a recurrent pattern.  This ‘stop-go’ policy cycle
brings about sharp swings in real GDP, real wages, sales, availability of
inputs and so on, introducing volatility and noise in enterprise sales
and cash flows and in household income and employment
opportunities.
Macroeconomic stability and economic performance in the
transition economies
The special experience of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and of
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have generated observations that
contain important lessons for the whole world, not just for CEE and
the FSU. 
In the 25 countries of operations36 of the EBRD there has been a
clear relationship between economic performance at the aggregate level
and macroeconomic control.  As Table 4 illustrates, those countries
which have shown the strongest commitment to reform are also the
ones which have simultaneously reduced inflation faster, suffered the
smallest GDP and fiscal revenue falls, and witnessed an earlier
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resumption of growth.  The respective medians of all the indicators for
each of the three groups of countries consistently depict the better
performance of the faster reformers.  For example, the median
contraction of GDP at the trough for the advanced reformers is about
one-quarter, whereas that for the early transition countries is about
one-half.  The same striking result applies to annual inflation, 22%
versus 125%, respectively, in 1995 (the corresponding figures for 1994
were 21% and 100% respectively).
Support for the view that macroeconomic stability promotes
growth by enhancing the quantity and quality of investment can be
found in Charts 1 and 2, which are based on a recent survey of
investors carried by the EBRD and are taken from the EBRD’s
Transition Report 1995.  Chart 1 shows a positive relationship between
the number of foreign direct investment projects in a country and an
index of the degree to which several reforms considered important for
a successful transition have been implemented.  The relationship is
non-linear, suggesting something like a threshold effect.
Chart 2 shows a negative relationship between a country’s rate of
inflation and the same FDI measure.
In a recent study, De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1995) (and see also
World Bank (1996)) calculate the profiles followed on average by
inflation and real growth in countries in transition during the years
prior to a reform breakthrough and during the years following that
breakthrough.  Their results are summarised in Charts 3 and 4.  Radical
reformers suffer an initial fall in real income of about 13% and a jump
in inflation to 14% per month during the year following the ‘big bang’;
nevertheless, they are able to: (i) resume positive growth four years
later; and (ii) control inflation to just below 3% per month during the
fifth year.  The typical pattern of recovery is one of rapidly expanding
private sector activity outweighing the contraction in public enterprise
output.  A parallel structural change occurs in the sectoral composition
of GDP, with the services sector increasing its share of GDP by 10
percentage points and with industry — particularly heavy industry —
witnessing a similar drop of its GDP share.  By contrast, the countries
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that postpone reform, although they are able in the beginning to limit
real income losses and to maintain low ‘official’ inflation (typically
with the help of price controls), end up in hyperinflation (average rates
of inflation of 23% per month) and deep depression (average yearly
income losses of about 10%).  The countries, particularly those in the
FSU, which have seen the greatest economic and social traumas —
including dramatic increases in age-specific mortality rates — are also
the ones where macroeconomic control has been lost.37
Clearly, in assessing the comparative data the differences in initial
political, social, cultural and economic conditions should not be
neglected.  The countries of the FSU embarked on transition two years
later than the CEEC.  Furthermore, the splitting of the former Soviet
Republics — the economies of which were tightly integrated and
complementary — was a far more traumatic shock than that of the
dissolution of the CMEA for the CEEC.  Moreover, the latter countries
had been functioning market economies until the 1940s, some of them
even buoyant performers.38  In contrast, the Russian economy at the
time of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, while growing fast, was a
predominately pre-capitalist, agricultural economy.  It also was a very
statist economy with a high degree of state ownership and control of
industry and a repressive set of institutions.  A few of the transition
economies (notably Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Russia and the
Ukraine) started their transitions with a sizeable external debt.  Others
(notably Romania) had little or no external debt to cope with.
Hungary and Poland had considerable prior experience with economic
reform.  Most of the others had to start from scratch around 1990.
There were also considerable differences in initial economic
structure.  Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were burdened with a legacy of
large homogeneous state farms.  Memories of the location and
operation of the old family farms were more than 70 years old.  This
greatly complicates land reform and the recreation of a private
agricultural sector.  In contrast, Poland preserved private ownership in
agriculture throughout the communist period and land reform in China
and Albania benefited from surviving memories and identification of
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private farms and farming (collectivisation having taken place no more
than 40 years earlier)39 and from the often smaller size and lesser
homogeneity of the collective farms.  As a result, land reform in
Albania was virtually instantaneous.  Belarus and Ukraine were also
saddled with an industrial structure biased heavily towards heavy
capital goods producing industries, for which post-reform market
demand was extremely limited.
IV DESIGNING POLICIES AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS
TO PROMOTE MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
The uncertainties and deterrents to investment and good decision-
making associated with macroeconomic mismanagement — and the ex-
post dead-weight losses imposed by prior decisions based on misguided
signals — apply across the economy.  These uncertainties are like
‘public bads’ and macroeconomic stability, a public good.  It is one of
the key roles of the government in a market economy to provide this
public good.  In order to achieve this, institutions are required that are
conducive to satisfactory macroeconomic performance.  The chronicle
of macroeconomic developments over the last three or four decades is
laced with unsuccessful stabilisation attempts which started off with
vigour, but failed to take hold due to the lack of the appropriate
institutions that would provide continuity to the process.  This is
particularly relevant to the economies in transition which have
inherited the ‘wrong’ or ‘no’ institutions and thus need to develop
those tailored to a market economy.  Given that a moderate degree of
macroeconomic stability is a pre-condition for efficient enterprise
decisions and for the productivity of investments, governments need to
place at the top of the reform agenda the building of the institutions
necessary to achieve and preserve macroeconomic stability.  Both
domestic and international institutions must be re-designed or created
from scratch in order to achieve the best possible global economic
performance for the next century.
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Building domestic institutions
What can be done then at the national or sub-national level, through
institutional development and the design, implementation and
enforcement of proper rules, to avoid unnecessary inflation and
unemployment and create the conditions within which the private
sector can flourish and generate sustained growth?  This is clearly not
just a technical issue, but an exercise in political economy.  It may
require major institutional re-design and even a change in the political
system.
One general lesson of the post-war period is the following: do not
impose on a country’s public administration burdens it cannot handle.
The experience of the transition economies emphasizes that even if
virtually all former state enterprises have been privatized,40 there
remains the enduring weakness of the general government sector
(public administration).  Lack of skills, lack of transparent legal
incentives, inadequate pay and career structures result in rent-seeking,
dishonesty and corruption.  This weakness constitutes a major
constraint on the speed of transition and reform.
Reforming the state 
It follows from this that the transition of the state is perhaps the most
important transition of all.  Outside the transition economies also, there
are many cases where reform of the institutions of general government
should have very high priority.  The possession (or early creation) of a
professional, high-status and well-motivated civil service seems to be
a defining characteristic of all the recent economic success stories.  Of
course, one should beware of confusing necessary with sufficient
conditions.  It is also important that the highly qualified and competent
civil services be content to limit the scope of its actions and
interventions to the domains outlined in Section II of this paper.  A
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strong but limited state is what is required.  Too many countries still
find themselves saddled with a weak but over-stretched, quasi-
ubiquitous and interfering state.  
It is vitally important that government regulation and intervention
do not create huge incentives for corruption and rent-seeking.  Any
government regulation and intervention will inevitably create some
such incentives.  Price controls, rationing and licensing are all
subvertible.  Transparency and accountability are key to minimising the
incidence and severity of these by-products of regulation and
intervention. 
In order to be able to provide the ‘public good’ of macroeconomic
stability, the economies in transition need to develop the institutions
required to perform inter alia the following key tasks.
Enforcing hard budget constraints
 
Enforcing hard budget constraints is the first rule of a market economy.
Without it, liberalising markets, freeing prices and privatising state
enterprises is pointless.  A hierarchy of hard budget constraints can be
visualised.  The Government/Central Bank should impose a hard
budget constraint on the banking sector, thereby prompting commercial
banks to enforce hard budget constraints on their borrowers in the
enterprise and household sectors.  The government should also refrain
from extending credit, directly or indirectly, to the non-financial
enterprise sector.  Any subsidies should be explicit line items in the
general government budget.  Note that unless hard budget constraints
can be imposed on the enterprise sector, stabilisation is virtually
guaranteed to go by the board.  Explicit or implicit government
subsidies will sooner or later show up in either the conventionally
measured fiscal deficit, or the ‘quasi-fiscal’ deficit of the central bank,
or the ‘deferred’ fiscal deficit (the contingent future claims on the
public finances currently hidden in the balance sheets of the enterprise
sector and/or the banking sector). 
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As an aside, it is interesting to note that governments throughout
the world are attempting to impose hard budget constraints on
themselves by establishing independent central banks and through
constitutional amendments putting restrictions on the government’s
ability to borrow, spend and tax.41  While not every one of these
attempts to restrict the fiscal-financial elbow room of the state makes
much sense (some indeed make no sense at all), one can appreciate the
sense of frustration with the government’s inability to stay with long-
term fiscal-financial commitments, that prompted this Ulyssian attempt
to tie oneself to the mast in order to resist the siren song of ‘fiscal
restraint tomorrow, but a little more jam today’.
Choosing a nominal anchor and establishing price stability   
In a closed economic system, the nominal anchor must perforce be an
internal one, such as a domestic monetary aggregate, the general price
level or nominal income.  In an open economic system the nominal
anchor can either be an internal or an external one (the nominal
exchange rate).  Unless full monetary union is opted for, the pursuit of
an exchange rate target will, however, imply constraints on the
behaviour of domestic nominal variables and instruments.  Domestic
credit expansion (monetary base growth net of the increase in the
external assets of the central bank) cannot systematically exceed the
growth of money demand at the target exchange rate.  If it did the
country would, sooner or later, run out of reserves and the external peg
would have to be abandoned.  Domestic unit cost inflation likewise
cannot systematically exceed the foreign rate of unit cost inflation plus
the target depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate.  If it did, the
country would become increasingly uncompetitive and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to the exchange rate peg would be
undermined.  In a fundamental sense therefore, even an external
nominal anchor ultimately relies for its credibility on the pursuit of
prudent domestic monetary and budgetary policies.  Anti-inflationary
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credibility cannot be ‘imported’; it can at most be ‘borrowed’ from
abroad.  Ultimately anti-inflationary credibility is home-made (see IMF
(1995b)).
Granted that the ultimate source of anti-inflationary credibility is
domestic fiscal and monetary restraint, an open economy still has the
option of pursuing an exchange rate peg (or some other rule for
managing or targeting the exchange rate).  This can be done through a
conventional central bank or through a currency board.  A currency
board issues domestic currency only in exchange for convertible
currencies at a fixed exchange rate.  The whole monetary base is fully-
backed by international reserves and is demand-driven.  Small, very
open economies may be advised to go for a currency board.  Hong
Kong in Asia, Panama and Argentina in Latin America and more
recently Estonia and Lithuania in eastern Europe have been successful
at stabilising inflation with the help of currency boards.  One downside
of currency boards is that the arrangement precludes the role of the
central bank as lender of last resort in the event of a systemic banking
crisis.  Latvia recently was faced with this dilemma, when its main
commercial bank collapsed.  Argentina too found itself with its public
sector hands tied in the face of a major banking crisis.  The difference
between a country managing a unilateral currency board and belonging
to a common currency area became painfully obvious: with a common
currency the common central bank has the option and the capacity of
acting as a lender of last resort to banks in all member countries.
Faced with banking crises or major capital inflows or outflows,
any fixed exchange rate regime other than a common currency is either
unsustainable or (as with a currency board) extremely costly.  A
floating exchange rate (where the float can be managed or controlled,
when circumstances permit) is likely to be the only realistic medium-
term choice of exchange rate regime for any country that is unable to
control international capital flows and unwilling to forsake the lender
of last resort function of the central bank.
Whatever the regime, credibility is key: unless a particular
institutional arrangement is adopted lastingly and in substance it is
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unlikely to survive.  Formal independence of the central bank is not
strictly necessary but there is evidence that independence helps deliver
macroeconomic stability and acts as a signal to domestic and
international financial markets that opportunistic devaluations or
depreciations of the currency are less likely.42
Banking supervision 
The supervision and regulation of the financial sector should be a top
priority.  High real interest rates and changing profitability across
enterprises and sectors — both inherent to transition — can, in the
absence of strong banking supervision, easily lead to non-performing
portfolios.  A big portion of the ‘bad loans’ will eventually be absorbed
by the state.
Tax administration  
The ability to levy taxes on a broad base, allowing both acceptable
marginal rates and revenue levels, is key to the state discharging its
obligations effectively and without recourse to the inflation tax.  As
noted above, in economies in transition this challenge is formidable.
Supplying the social safety net
Shifting the burden of providing the safety net traditionally supplied by
state enterprises to the general government constitutes another major
fiscal challenge in the transition economies.  Even in the advanced
industrial countries, the tension between declining active-inactive
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population ratios and lower trend growth of productivity on the one
hand, and on the other hand the demands made on the budget by social
expenditures (especially health and pension benefits), is never far
below the surface in the politico-economic debate.  There is increasing
recognition of the fact that the government need not supply directly the
services it finances.  A part can be contracted out to the private sector
or the ‘civil society’/not-for-profit sector.  Note, however, that, except
insofar as private provision is more efficient in the administration of
social benefits and the provision of social services, privatisation merely
changes the label on the sacrifices made by the currently active
population, without reducing their nature and magnitude.
Transition economies also confront in extreme form the issue of
intergenerational equity faced throughout the world.  The older
generations have shorter time horizons and their opportunity to
accumulate wealth bypasses them in favour of skilled and dynamic
younger workers and entrepreneurs able to earn high incomes in the
private sector.  Transition thus focuses attention on the role of the state
in effecting intergenerational incomes transfers in a cost-effective way.
Coping with international capital flows
In principle, the ability to run current account deficits and surpluses is
welfare-improving.  A country that can lend abroad or borrow abroad
can decouple domestic absorption from domestic income.  International
intertemporal trade permits improved consumption smoothing.  Even
‘pure consumption loans’ — loans that do not result in increased
domestic capital formation — can be welfare-enhancing as long as the
constraints implied by the need to maintain intertemporal solvency are
recognised and respected: the existing stock of net foreign liabilities has
to be matched, in present discounted value terms, by a stream of future
primary external surpluses.43  In addition, foreign borrowing that
finances productive domestic capital formation (domestic investment
whose rate of return is at least equal to the cost of foreign borrowing)
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further enhances the borrowing nation’s current and future private and
public consumption programme.  Finally, as well as permitting
international intertemporal trade, the ability to engage in international
financial transactions allows international risk-sharing.  Such
international insurance can be obtained even without any net
international inflows or outflows, with matching gross external assets
and liabilities.
Granted that the ability to unbalance the current account
enhances a country’s opportunity set and that, with well-functioning
markets and appropriate policies, there will be gains from international
intertemporal trade and from international risk-sharing, it is
nevertheless apparent that there have been cases in which poorly
functioning markets and/or inappropriate policies have turned this
potential blessing into a curse (see eg Williamson (1995)).
Many of the NICs, some of the Latin American countries that
have successfully initiated macroeconomic stabilisation and structural
reform and a growing number of the more advanced and successful
transition economies, have experienced very significant gross and net
capital inflows.  The typical result has been an appreciation of the real
exchange rate (either through an appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate and/or through an increase in the domestic rate of price and cost
inflation), a rapid increase in the money stock (fuelled by increasing
international reserves rather than by domestic credit expansion), a
financial market boom, characterised by rapidly rising stock market
valuations and fast growth of bank lending and a rapid expansion in the
level of domestic economic activity often driven by domestic capital
formation.  
Qualitatively, all these responses are consistent with a proper,
equilibrium adjustment to a correctly perceived improvement in the rate
of return to financial and real investment in the country in question.
The appreciation of the real exchange rate (or increase in the relative
price of non-traded to traded goods) could be the manifestation of a
beneficial version of ‘Dutch disease’.  Quantitatively, however, the
responses could be excessive and harmful for a number of reasons.
49
First, the perceived improvement in the rate of return to investing
in the country experiencing the capital inflow could be based on an
unrealistic assessment of the fundamentals.  Financial markets,
domestic and international, are subject to bouts of euphoria and gloom
that at times seem completely detached from the fundamentals.  In a
world with incomplete markets, bandwagon effects, herding behaviour,
noise traders, speculative bubbles (rational and/or irrational) can
drown out the fundamentals that efficient financial markets are
supposed to reflect and transmit.  The capital inflows are therefore
potentially ephemeral.  They could be reversed suddenly, for reasons
no better than the ones that prompted the original inflows.  If real
resources are invested and reallocated domestically in response to
relative price changes whose degree of permanence is overestimated by
enterprises and households, unexpected reversals of these relative price
movements could inflict significant real resource costs, as capital
formation and real resource reallocation is always characterised by
sunk, (partly) irreversible, costs.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that domestic factor
markets and markets for industrial goods and services are typically
much less flexible and efficient than the international financial markets.
The interaction of a floating exchange rate, determined in a reasonably
efficient foreign exchange market, and domestic labour and output
markets full of nominal and/or real rigidities can lead to ugly results.
The example of real exchange rate overshooting, through the
interaction of a flexible nominal exchange rate and sticky money wages
in response to restrictive monetary policy under conditions of high
international capital mobility (see Dornbusch (1976)) is familiar:
anticipating the success of the anti-inflationary monetary policy,
operators in the foreign exchange market bid up the value of the
domestic currency.  Unlike the nominal exchange rate, domestic costs
and prices are not continuously renegotiated in fully flexible auction
markets.  When a sharp nominal appreciation meets a sluggishly
responding level of domestic costs, a sharp real appreciation and loss
of competitiveness results.
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A further complicating factor is that domestic financial markets
in reforming economies are often still in a quite rudimentary stage of
development.  The evaluation of the commercial merits of projects
clamouring for loans is always a difficult and risky business.  The
capacity for screening projects adequately is often quite insufficient in
countries faced with a sudden inflow of capital.  
In the absence of unlimited deposit insurance, banking systems
are always vulnerable to ‘runs’.  The reason is that deposits have a
fixed price and can be withdrawn on demand, while the majority of
bank assets (mainly loans) cannot be securitised and are highly illiquid.
The same fundamentals are consistent with a ‘good’ equilibrium, in
which no depositor finds it individually rational to withdraw his
deposits, as he or she does not expect anyone else to do so and a ‘bad’
equilibrium, in which it is individually rational for individual depositors
to run because they expect everyone else to do likewise.  Two
‘solutions’ to the bank run problem, unrestricted deposit insurance,
and ‘bank holidays’ (limits on the amount that can be withdrawn by
any depositor) are subject to obvious drawbacks.  In the case of deposit
insurance the problem is moral hazard.  Bank holidays are
indiscriminate as they penalise those who need to withdraw funds for
good business reasons.  The anticipation of possible future restrictions
on withdrawals also encourages disintermediation by undermining the
attractiveness of depositing one’s money in banks. 
Bank runs are socially costly because banks are, especially in
developing countries and transition economies, the main intermediary
between ultimate savers and investors and because they play a key role
in the country’s payment mechanism.  
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Policy responses to disruptive capital flows
a) Measures that can be taken by individual countries
The first and best approach to the co-existence of flexible, efficient
financial markets and inefficient, rigid factor and product markets
would no doubt be to ‘flex’ the inflexible, rigid markets.  While
measures to improve the functioning of domestic factor and product
markets are clearly desirable and should be pursued resolutely, even in
the absence of a capital inflow or outflow problem, turning all markets
into perfectly functioning (Arrow-Debreu) markets is not a practical
option.  In addition, the problem of disruptive capital flows that do not
represent a proper response to the underlying fundamentals would not
disappear even if domestic factor and product markets functioned
efficiently.  Recognising this, Tobin (1982) and others have proposed,
as a second-best solution, to ‘throw sand in the wheels’ of some of the
highly flexible financial markets in order to stop them from creating
havoc in their interaction with more sticky factor and product markets.
‘Tobin’ taxes on foreign exchange transactions (possibly with the tax
rate decreasing with the length of the period between the purchase and
sale of the domestic security in order to discourage quick reversals of
positions without penalising long-term portfolio investment and FDI)
are one of the more frequently proposed interventions.  Others include
administrative and fiscal controls on international capital flows, such
as punitive reserve requirements on balances used for taking open
positions to attack currencies.
When assessing the feasibility and desirability of such capital
controls, it is important to differentiate between on the one hand the
advanced industrial countries with their highly sophisticated and
developed financial markets, and on the other hand the developing
countries and transition economies.  As regards the advanced industrial
countries, it does not seem possible to put the capital flow genie back
in the bottle through fiscal and administrative capital controls.  The
scope and efficiency of the global industry ready to take on the
52
authorities by supplying the means to avoid and evade controls is quite
awesome.  The rewards from taking on the monetary authorities are too
high: given the ineffective penalties likely to be imposed and the low
risk of being caught evading the controls, the odds on capital controls
working effectively are virtually nil.  Proposals for imposing non-
interest-bearing reserve requirements on balances used for taking open
positions to attack currencies appear naive because they ignore key
developments of the last two decades in the international financial
markets.  There are myriad ways now of attacking a currency: through
the spot markets, through the futures and swap markets and through
other derivatives markets, including option markets.  The authorities
now operate in many of these markets, so ‘net positions’ would have
to be identified and be subject to reserve requirements in all these
markets.  ‘Tobin taxes’ on foreign exchange transactions would
likewise have to be expanded in their coverage to include transactions
in the option markets and in markets for all other kinds of derivatives.
They would also have to be imposed and enforced globally in order to
be effective.
For countries that are not yet fully integrated into the global
financial system and that have much less developed and sophisticated
domestic financial markets, capital controls are a more realistic option.
A number of general guidelines should be respected, however.  
First, there should be no restrictions on the purchase and sale of
foreign exchange for financing current account transactions.  The
repatriation of profits and interest on legal investments should likewise
be unrestricted.  It is well-known that capital account transactions can
be disguised as current account transactions: leads and lags in the
invoicing of imports and exports, under-invoicing of exports and over-
invoicing of imports will cause slippage in the application of any
controls that discriminate between current and capital transactions.
The question is not whether this kind of evasion exists, but whether it
takes place on a scale sufficient to substantially emasculate the
controls.  There are, we would judge, many cases where they can be
53
enforced tightly enough to reduce substantially the magnitude of
sudden capital flows.  
Foreign direct investment also should not be discouraged, as it is
often bundled with the international transfer of managerial and
technical know-how that would otherwise not enter the capital
importing country on anything like the same scale.  We recognise that
the distinction between FDI and portfolio investment is not a clear-cut
one and that it is possible to disguise portfolio investment as FDI, but
again, the question is not whether the controls would work perfectly,
but whether they would substantially reduce the volatility of capital
flows.  Again the evidence is consistent with the view that they can
make a significant difference.44
There are some obvious negatives associated with any attempt to
impose or re-impose capital controls selectively.  First, the authorities
would have to keep records of foreign exchange transactions again.  In
a number of countries, foreign exchange market liberalisation has been
accompanied by the complete dismantling of the information collecting
apparatus of the authorities, alongside the administrative and legal
enforcement capacity.  Second, any (re-) imposition of capital controls
generates new areas of administrative discretion and therefore
inevitably creates new opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption.
Simplicity and transparency of the new rules is therefore essential, to
minimise such adverse side-effects.
There is an important further reason for practising caution in the
application of capital controls.  It is not difficult to come up with a
long list of examples of countries where the main disruption caused by
a sudden sharp capital outflow was the disruption of the government’s
undesirable and unsustainable policies.  If capital flows respond to
fundamentals only, they can impose market discipline firmly and
swiftly on disruptive governments.  Eliminating the scope for funds to
enter or leave the country swiftly and with little notice is a positive
development only if the capital flows are motivated poorly in relation
to fundamentals and/or domestic factor and product markets are
inefficient.  It is a negative development if capital flows properly
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respond to the right fundamentals and if restrictions on these flows
encourage delays in policy reform and in the restructuring of domestic
factor and product markets.
Should the currency be allowed to appreciate in the face of
significant capital inflows?
Consider a small open economy faced with a sudden capital inflow.
The cause could be internal (eg a combination of international
financial liberalisation by the country and an improvement in its
investment climate due, say, to successful macroeconomic stabilisation)
or external (eg a change in the rules, laws or practices governing
investment in emerging markets in one or more of the leading financial
centres).  If the desired net inflow of capital exceeds the current
account deficit at the prevailing exchange rate, the country has two
options.  Either it allows the currency to appreciate or it continues to
peg the exchange rate at the same level, thus allowing an increase in the
stock of foreign exchange reserves.  If the second alternative is chosen,
a further choice has to be made.  Either the increase in foreign
exchange reserves is permitted to feed through into an increase in the
domestic money stock or it is ‘sterilised’, that is, domestic credit is
contracted by the same amount as foreign reserves are increasing,
resulting in an unchanged domestic money stock.  
Note that the statement that net capital inflows exceed the current
account deficit at the prevailing exchange rate only makes sense as a
statement about equilibrium,45 if at the same time the increase in the
demand for money at the current exchange rate and the current general
price level exceeds domestic credit expansion.  The increase in the
demand for money (the shift of the conventional money demand
function) could eg be due to the same improvement in confidence that
prompted the capital inflows.  Other possible causes of an increase in
the demand for money include a reduction in the opportunity cost of
holding money (due to lower domestic nominal interest rates reflecting
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increased international financial liberalisation and/or a lower expected
domestic rate of inflation) and an increase in the transactions demand
for money reflecting booming domestic demand and rising real output.
Typically, surging capital inflows are associated with a booming
domestic economy.  While domestic output may well be rising,
domestic absorption outstrips domestic production — this is the
income-expenditure counterpart to the increased net inflow of capital.
Even if the proximate cause of the capital inflows is an improvement in
domestic supply conditions (an improvement in productivity or a
change in the regulatory or tax environment), demand (typically led by
investment) is outstripping domestic supply and an increase in the
relative price of domestic non-traded goods to traded goods is required
to restore balance.  Such an appreciation of the real exchange rate
(which may be accompanied by an increase in the relative price of
exportables to import-competing goods if the country in question is
large in the world markets for its tradable goods and services) is in
principle the appropriate, equilibrium response to the shocks generating
the capital inflow surge.  It is essentially a benign version of the ‘Dutch
disease’, where a windfall (say a natural resource discovery) raises
national permanent income and thus causes an increase in the relative
price of non-traded goods to traded goods and a movement of resources
into the non-traded goods sector.  ‘Overshooting’ of the required
equilibrium real appreciation is of course always possible, especially
if the nominal exchange rate is allowed to float freely, but some real
appreciation is both necessary and unavoidable.  A key policy issue
remaining is whether the required real appreciation is to be achieved
swiftly, through an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, or more
gradually, through an increase in domestic prices and costs at a fixed
nominal exchange rate.
Consider the case where the nominal exchange rate is kept fixed.
If financial capital mobility is perfect, sterilisation of the reserve inflows
is not an option: the increased demand for real money balances (at the
prevailing exchange rate and nominal price level) that is the
counterpart to the inflow in foreign exchange reserves must be
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accommodated instantaneously.  Either domestic credit is expanded or
a ‘stock-shift’ inflow of foreign exchange reserves will occur to ensure
that the endogenous (demand-determined) money supply always equals
the demand for domestic money.  When capital mobility is imperfect,
sterilisation can work for a while.  Note, however, that sterilisation of
foreign exchange losses is likely to cause an increase in the quasi-fiscal
deficit of the central bank.  The reason is that the interest rate earned
on the additional foreign reserves acquired by the central bank is likely
to be below that paid on the assets (typically Treasury debt) given up
or the liabilities (eg central bank interest-bearing debt) incurred by the
central bank in order to finance the acquisition of the reserves.  Even
if sterilisation is successful in the short run, the increase in domestic
interest rates associated with successful sterilisation will encourage
even larger capital inflows that will ultimately swamp the ability or the
willingness of the authorities to persist in its sterilisation efforts.
Sooner or later therefore, the reserve inflows will be monetised (or the
exchange rate peg will be abandoned).
If the (nominal) exchange rate is allowed to appreciate, the capital
inflows will be associated with an immediate appreciation of the real
exchange rate (a loss of international competitiveness, an increase in
the relative price of traded and non-traded goods and, if the country
has any market power in world markets, an increase in the relative price
of exportables to importables).  If the nominal exchange rate is kept
pegged, the same ultimate real appreciation will occur, but more
gradually, with the domestic price level (and especially the price of
non-traded goods) rising faster than world prices.  The higher domestic
price level is supported by the increase in the money stock that is the
counterpart of the increased foreign exchange reserves.  Sterilisation
can further slow down this process.  The choice between rapid real
appreciation through a nominal appreciation of the currency and
slower real appreciation through the gradual inflation of domestic costs
and prices is not straightforward.  If the capital flows are expected to
be reversed in the not too distant future, and if the authorities believe
that the private sector has a tendency to overestimate the degree of
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permanence of changes in prices and exchange rates, a case can be
made for attempting to slow down changes in the real exchange rate by
continuing to peg the currency.  If the changes are not expected to be
reversed (or if the private sector responds appropriately to correctly
perceived temporary changes in the real exchange rate), it may make
more sense to float the currency (or an any rate to permit a significant
nominal appreciation) in the face of a sudden increase in capital
inflows.
b) Measures to be taken by the international community
Every country’s capital inflow is some other country’s (or countries’)
capital outflow.  Every sudden currency appreciation is matched by a
sudden currency depreciation somewhere in the rest of the world.
Changes in external economic conditions that are (properly) viewed as
exogenous by small or medium-sized individual open economies are
the endogenous global outcomes of policies and other developments in
the world as a whole.  A systemic perspective on the problem of
disruptive capital flows is therefore essential.  
Traditionally, the task of dealing with systemic financial issues
has been located with the IMF.  Since its inception, the Fund has
performed two distinct roles.  The first is its systemic role; the second
the provision of short-term financing and technical assistance to
individual member countries in balance-of-payments difficulties.  The
systemic role — managing the adjustable peg exchange rate system
established at Bretton Woods and providing it with sufficient liquidity
— effectively came to an end in 1972 with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods exchange rate system.  Private capital markets increasingly took
over the role of the Fund as a provider of global liquidity and a source
of short-term financing for the more advanced industrial countries. 
Exchange rate surveillance is the surviving offspring of this systemic
role, but it is just a pale reflection of the earlier systemic function.46
There are several reasons for this.  First, regular gatherings such as
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those of the G3, the G7 and the G10 have taken over some of the
earlier consultative functions of the Fund.  More fundamentally, the
Fund has neither the stick nor the carrots to induce the largest
industrial countries (or even the medium-sized ones) to act on its
recommendations.  Since Healey went to the IMF in the autumn of
1976, no G-10 country has been in such dire financial trouble that
access to the resources of the Fund (or obtaining the Fund’s stamp of
good house-keeping) has been essential for the maintenance of liquidity
and solvency.  
Still, there are obvious global gains from the collective pursuit of
macroeconomic policies that are conducive to low and stable real
interest rates and that avoid both short-term excess volatility and
medium-term persistent misalignment of the exchange rates of the main
industrial countries.  Giving teeth to IMF (exchange rate) surveillance
would therefore clearly be desirable.  If pursued with determination, it
would achieve three key objectives.  First, it would put greater pressure
on the governments of the main industrial nations to recognise the
external effects of macroeconomic and other policies pursued for
mainly domestic objectives.  ‘Benign neglect’ would no longer be an
option.  Second, it would improve the quality of macroeconomic
management world-wide, especially in developing countries and
transition economies.  Third, it would ensure that the global sum of
policies that are individually rational to the member countries is a
combined global monetary-fiscal mix that makes sense from the point
of view of the whole international community.
Another desirable global economic policy development with a
direct impact on capital flows would be a move towards greater
international co-operation between national tax authorities, so as to
minimise capital flows driven purely by tax arbitrage or outright tax
evasion.  The natural institutional ‘home’ of such increased co-
operation between national tax authorities is less apparent than the
case for locating the responsibility for enhanced surveillance in the
IMF.
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Building international economic institutions
There are public goods whose domain or scope extends beyond the
boundaries of any nation state and externalities that likewise do not
respect national boundaries.  Building up the institutions or
arrangements for supplying supra-national (including global) public
goods and for internalising these supra-national externalities is a key
task for governments and multilateral institutions (agencies).  If, as
seems possible, the rest of this decade is going to be a period of relative
global stability and reasonable global economic progress, this must be
the time to strengthen international institutions, agencies and
arrangements.  
Examples include the following:
C Strengthen the WTO and extend its scope to include trade in all
goods and services, including agricultural goods.  The agency
should have the authority to tackle the key (and sensitive) issue
of the role of regional preferential trading arrangements in an
integrated global economy.
C Create a vehicle through which global environmental issues
(greenhouse effects and global warming; the weakening of the
ozone layer; pollution of the atmosphere and the oceans; acid
rain; reductions in biodiversity; desertification; depletion of
oceanic fish-stocks and other renewable resources subject to
common property problems etc) can be monitored and tackled
on a better than ad hoc basis.  Maybe the World Bank could be
given this task.  Perhaps a purpose-designed new institution is
required. 
C Extend and adapt the Basle agreements for capital adequacy in
the global banking sector to other global financial
intermediaries.
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V BEYOND STABILISATION — THE GENERATION OF
RECOVERY AND GROWTH
The one thing we can be certain of is the occurrence in the future of
unanticipated shocks.  It is also true, however, that, on the basis of
currently available information, it is not easy to identify major systemic
imbalances likely to lead to predictable conflagrations and calamities.
In many parts of the world (India, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa are
obvious exceptions) structural adjustment is largely completed or at
least well under way.  China has proceeded a long way down the road
of reform with striking results.  A number of East and Central
European economies have advanced impressively in the transition.
How should policy makers at the national and international level take
advantage of this relative absence of foreseeable traumas, that is, of the
likelihood of a period of relatively steady growth and systemic
stability? 
The short answer is that good times should be used to take care
of the future, that is, of the long run.  Both the quantity and the quality
of investment, broadly defined, need attention. Good times offer the
political window of opportunity for looking after the future.  That
means raising saving rates and boosting capital formation, defined to
encompass additions to the stocks of human capital (through education,
training or other learning experiences), environmental capital and
knowledge capital as well as the accumulation of physical capital.
In the remainder of this section we consider the long-term supply
side economics of boosting saving and broadly defined capital
formation.
Policies to promote saving in the industrial countries
Funding the state social security retirement schemes
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Most industrial countries have a significant unfunded (pay-as-you-go)
social security retirement scheme in which compulsory ‘contributions’
(indistinguishable from regular taxes on labour income) paid by the
working population (the young and middle-aged) are used to finance
the concurrent payment of retirement benefits to the retired population
(the old).  Such a scheme redistributes lifetime resources from young
to the old.
An unfunded social security retirement scheme
To assess the effect of unfunded social security on private and
aggregate saving, consider the introduction of a balanced budget social
security retirement scheme in an economy in which previously there
was only voluntary private saving for retirement.  The scheme consists
of a constant per capita contribution by the young (the working
generation), shared out equally among those currently retired.  We
assume that households confirm to the life-cycle model of saving,
without any intergenerational gifts and bequests.  For simplicity we
ignore the possible effects of the introduction of such a scheme on the
age of retirement.  Uncertainty and precautionary savings are also not
considered at this point, although we will refer to them later.  To focus
clearly on the direct effect of the introduction of the scheme on saving,
we hold interest rates and wage rates constant, although there will, of
course, be general equilibrium repercussions from the introduction of
the scheme on these variables.
A pure unfunded social security retirement scheme is a balanced-
budget (lump-sum) redistribution from the young to the old.  There are
therefore no direct effects on the government budget and on public
saving.  When the scheme is introduced, the existing old generation gets
a pure windfall: they receive benefits during their old age without
having made any contributions while young.  Their consumption will
be boosted by the amount of the windfall.47  For the young, and for all
subsequent generations, the effect of the introduction of the scheme on
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the present discounted value of their life-time resources will be positive
if the population growth rate (the ‘biological rate of return’ on the
scheme) exceeds the real interest rate, negative if the opposite holds.
The effect of the introduction of the scheme on the saving of the
young, and therefore on the total stock of financial wealth in the
economy, is unambiguously negative: income is taxed away when
young, while an unrequited benefit is received during old age.  Wishing
to smooth consumption over their life-cycle, the young will lower their
saving.  Since the scheme is balanced budget by assumption, the capital
stock in the next period will be less than it would otherwise have
been.48 
An aggregate funded social security retirement scheme
Now consider a change of this unfunded scheme to an aggregate
funded scheme, administered again by the government.  Contributions
remain compulsory and benefits are still paid to individuals in such a
way that there is no link, for the individual, between the individual
contribution while young and the individual retirement benefit while
old.  The government, however, takes the contributions of each
generation and invests them (earning the market rate of return).  The
aggregate retirement benefits of each generation are equal to the
aggregate contributions made while young, plus the interest earned
from investing them.  From the point of view of its effects on individual
saving behaviour, this scheme is not essentially different from an
unfunded scheme.  The contributions while young are effectively a
lump-sum tax, while the benefits while old are effectively an
unrequited, lump-sum transfer payment.  Again, private saving by the
young is discouraged, compared to a situation of only voluntary private
saving.  The negative effect on private saving is larger with the aggregate
funded scheme than with the unfunded scheme if the rate of return on
the fund exceeds the population growth rate, smaller if the opposite
condition prevails.  Note that such an aggregate funded scheme will
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not, in general, be a balanced-budget scheme.  Assuming the per capita
contributions of the young are constant, the scheme will need money
if the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of population.
Note that the negative effect of an aggregate funded social security
retirement scheme on private saving behaviour will be present
regardless of whether the scheme is administered by the government or
by the private sector.  As long as no individual contributor/beneficiary
perceives a link between his or her individual life-time contributions
and his or her individual life-time retirement benefits, that is, as long as
the scheme is not an individual defined contribution scheme, there will
be a negative effect on the saving rate.
A social security retirement scheme with individual accounts
Now consider modifying the aggregate funded scheme to one with
individual accounts.  The scheme is still compulsory, but each
individual’s contributions while young are invested (earning the market
rate) in a named individual account.  When he/she retires, each
individual received as a benefit his/her own lifetime contributions, plus
accumulated returns from their investment.49  Such a scheme is
effectively a compulsory saving scheme.  If the rate of return on the
individual account is the same as that on discretionary (voluntary)
private saving, and if there are no constraints on the ability of the
individual to vary discretionary private saving, such a compulsory
saving scheme would have no effect on private saving by the young,
compared to a situation with only voluntary private saving.  It would,
of course, raise their saving compared to the unfunded scheme or the
aggregate funded scheme.
Compared to the situation with only voluntary private saving, the
kind of compulsory private saving scheme we describe would raise
aggregate saving by the young if the young cannot reduce their
voluntary, discretionary saving one-for-one in response to the
introduction of the compulsory scheme.  This is likely to be empirically
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significant if voluntary saving rates are low, private wealth is illiquid
and financial markets make it hard to dissave or to borrow.  The
individually funded, contribution-defined scheme could be
administered privately or publicly.
Compulsory saving schemes are attractive if households are
myopic or if there are moral hazard problems that affect the private
provision for one’s old age.  It could be that case that, without
compulsion, the young would not have saved adequately, expecting to
throw themselves on the mercy of the community when old age arrived.
Forced saving (assuming offsetting discretionary dissaving is now
possible) helps to solve this problem.  The same moral hazard problem
would also lead one to favour paying out the retirement benefit not as
a lump-sum, but as a stream of annuity payments.
Clearly, the individual accounts, contribution-defined scheme
could not, without additions or modifications, provide universal old-
age security.  The low-paid and those without an income could not
make the required contributions.  One solution would be to have the
state contribute to the accounts of the poorer citizens, maintaining the
individually funded character of the scheme.  Another solution would
be to preserve a basic unfunded scheme to provide the social retirement
minimum.
Unfunded social security retirement schemes not only help
smooth income over the life-cycle, thus permitting consumption-
smoothing over the life-cycle, they also reduce uncertainty, permitting
consumption smoothing across states of nature.  While this is clearly
desirable in its own right, it may lead to a further negative effect on
private saving, if the precautionary saving motive is operative.
Current unfunded social security retirement schemes (and indeed
the subsidised public sector health and disability insurance schemes)
were designed on the basis of demographic projections that turned out
to be wrong.  The rapid greying of the populations of the industrial
countries (and other developments that have lowered the active/inactive
ratio for the population as a whole) has created a ‘youth deficit’ that
makes it impossible to finance current and future benefit entitlements
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(under current laws and regulations) with the contribution rates and
obligations embodied in current laws and regulations.  Unfavourable
demographics (and to a certain extent also disappointing productivity
growth) therefore have created conditions under which
intergenerational conflict is unavoidable.  If the younger generations
lose, contribution rates will be raised or the contribution base will be
broadened.  If the older generations give way, benefit rates will be
lowered or eligibility restricted.
An early start on reform will minimise the extent to which
implicit or explicit clauses of the social contract will have to be
reneged on.  It would hardly be a propitious start to the new era of the
rule of law and the sanctity of contract if among the first acts of the
reforming government is the wholesale expropriation of the pension
rights and entitlements of generations that lived through the Great
Depression, the Second World War and (in the case of the FSU and
east and central European nations) the bleak decades of central
planning.  As pointed out in the previous paragraph, however, the
expectations of current and future contributors (based on the pre-
reform record of pay-outs) are inconsistent.  Either benefits will turn
out to be lower than expected or contributions higher than expected,
or both.  Painless social security reform is not an option.
The way in which this intergenerational conflict is resolved will
not just have distributional consequences.  It will also have important
incentive and efficiency effects.  Raising contribution rates, for
instance, would have adverse impacts on labour demand and supply.
In the industrial countries too, demographic developments and
disappointing productivity growth have made the old (implicit) social
security contract inconsistent and unsustainable. 
Reducing public debt-GDP ratios 
Policies that reduce public debt-GDP ratios by raising current revenues
are, similarly, redistributions from current to future generations.  In
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most of the industrial countries, however, the overall tax burden (and
the marginal effective rates of taxation they imply) is already so high
that, both on efficiency and political feasibility grounds, it is hard to
make a case for a further increases that is politically convincing.
Current spending cuts are likely, therefore, to be the main mechanism
through which, in the industrial countries, the burden of the public
debt is reduced.  In many of the FSU countries and in many developing
countries the overall tax burden is much more moderate, and well-
designed tax enhancement measures (say through base broadening,
improved enforcement and elimination of exemptions), if well
implemented, need not have overwhelming adverse effects on
incentives.
Raising the after-tax real rate of return to saving  
Most of the available empirical evidence suggests that aggregate private
saving does not respond significantly to moderate changes in the after-
tax real rate of return on saving.50  Policies to raise the after-tax rate of
return to saving would therefore not have an appreciable effect on
aggregate saving rates.  Note, however, that the insensitivity of saving
to its rate of return reflects the combined effect of the substitution
effect (which has saving increasing with its rate of return) and the
income effect (which goes in the opposite direction for net lenders).
Policy reforms that raise the marginal rate of return to private saving
(say by reducing the degree of progression in the tax rate on saving and
thus lowering the marginal tax rate on saving), without reducing the
average return to private saving (by maintaining the same average tax
rate on private saving), will therefore affect behaviour only through the
substitution effect.
Apart from policies to affect aggregate private saving,
considerable efficiency gains can be achieved by reducing or
eliminating distortions in the allocation of saving among competing
instruments.  
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Policies to promote investment
Section III has dealt at length with the positive effects on private
investment of policies to improve macroeconomic stability.  Several
additional policies to enhance the quantity and quality of investment,
broadly defined, should also be pursued.  The unique role of the state
here lies in promoting forms of capital investment that either have a
very long gestation- and pay-off period or have returns that are non-
rival and/or cannot be fully appropriated by private investors.  The
following are of importance.
Education and training
Subsidising education and training is a natural function of the state.
First, as we indicated earlier, there are ‘merit good’ and ‘rights’
arguments for partial or full public funding.  Second, not all of the
returns to education can be captured privately.  More educated citizens
make better citizens.  Parents who were well-educated in turn facilitate
the education of their own children.  There are significant peer-group
effects in education and socialisation.  There is evidence that a worker’s
productivity rises with the average productivity of the co-workers and
associates.  Enterprises are likely to under-invest in on-the-job training
if such training is costly and if the human capital thus acquired by the
worker is portable.  Making workers pay for their own training may not
be an option because most workers neither possess the financial
resources to finance these training expenses, nor are in a position to
offer effective collateral for ‘training loans’.  Making workers ‘post
bond’, to be forfeited in case the worker quits soon after being trained
at the expense of the firm, runs into the same problem of inadequate
financial resources.  In addition, it would not be legal in many
countries.
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Education and training facilitate both the transmission of
knowledge and the creation of new knowledge.  Knowledge is the
ultimate non-rival good.51  This provides an argument both for
subsidising education and training and for subsidising fundamental
R&D.  
The arguments are not all one-way, however.  Certain kinds of
education have certification or ‘sheep-skin’ value, because they are
viewed as signals of unobservable desirable characteristics such as
intelligence, knowledge, productivity etc.  Private agents may over-
invest in educational qualifications which have these certification
properties.  The armies of lawyers produced in some developing
countries may be the outcome of such a process.  These problems are
more likely to occur at the university level than at the pre-school,
primary and secondary school levels.  The merit good, rights and
externality arguments are also likely to apply more strongly at these
levels, particularly in developing countries. 
Raising the active/inactive population ratio
Another means of raising the effective human capital stock in the
industrial countries, and of doing so almost ‘at a stroke’, are legislative
changes in the rules determining the active-inactive population ratio.
Policies that reduce dependency ratios may well be desirable both from
the point of view of economic efficiency, and from the point of view of
distributional equity among generations.  Dependents are the young,
the sick and the old.  Education, public health, preventive medicine
and poverty reduction can have strong effects on morbidity.  Education,
rising living standards and availability of contraception can influence
birth rates.  In both cases, education of females is of special
importance.  Large-scale immigration by persons of working age is
likely to be politically controversial in much of the industrial world
(which is not to say that it will not happen).  From an economic point
of view, immigration affects different generations in very different ways.
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The retired population will welcome the contribution of the young
immigrant workers to their unfunded social security retirement
schemes.  They will also, as owners of much of the domestic capital
stock, benefit from any increase in the rate of return to domestic capital
brought about by the immigration.  Younger workers, especially those
in the same (lower) skill categories as the immigrants, will view the new
arrivals primarily as competitors in the labour markets.
That leaves raising the labour force participation rate of the old
as the obvious means for boosting the active/inactive ratio in the
population as a whole.  An increase in the age of retirement by, say,
five years would help resolve many of problems faced by the unfunded
social security systems of the industrial world.  An increase in the
retirement age here means an increase in the minimum age at which one
becomes eligible for a retirement pension, and a matching increase in
the number of years one is obliged to make contributions to the social
security funds.  Such an increase in the age of retirement could be
combined with the abolition of the notion of automatic compulsory
retirement at a particular age.  The USA recently abolished compulsory
retirement for the vast majority of workers.  Complementary changes
in seniority systems and arrangements would be likely to be associated
with such changes.
The proposed increase in the age of retirement makes sense and
is fair in view of the increase in the life expectancy of both men and
women and the improved health and vigour enjoyed by many until well
into their seventies.52  Note that raising the number of working years
relative to the number of non-working years in an individual’s life span,
will not necessarily raise the long-run ratio of private wealth to income,
but it will, of course, increase the viability, and reduce the disincentive
effects associated with, any remaining unfunded component of the
social security system.
It may seem strange, with so much of Western Europe still
plagued by persistent high unemployment and with continued interest
in many quarters in such measures as compulsory work-sharing,
reductions in the duration of the working week and the encouragement
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of early retirement, to advocate measures aimed at achieving a sizable
increase in the effective supply of labour.  Yet is seems likely that the
problem facing the industrial nations in the coming decades will be one
of insufficient labour (and of insufficiently skilled and educated labour)
in relation to the real income expectations and aspirations of a greying
population. 
Unemployment in Western Europe, except for a cyclical
component53, is mainly a self-inflicted wound to be cured by structural
measures which include the improvement of the skill level and mix, the
reduction of the wedge between take-home pay and gross marginal
labour costs, the reduction of the gap between the private and the
social cost of hiring and firing workers, the encouragement of  mobility
of firms and workers and the facilitation of investment in long-term
productive relationships by workers and employers.
Increasing infrastructure and other spending to enhance long-
term growth potential 
With a benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent social planner, public
investment projects are undertaken whenever the social rate of return
on the resources that are committed exceeds their opportunity cost, the
social discount rate.  There is no automatic presumption that the social
rate of return on public sector investment is more likely to exceed the
social discount rate in good times than in bad times.  In the real world,
however, political economy considerations produce the following
robust empirical regularity: whenever the government budget gets
squeezed (typically when recession, depression or structural decline
depress current government receipts), capital budgets get slashed.
Public sector investment spending and other productivity-enhancing
expenditures (repairs and maintenance, R&D) are the first to be cut.
Effective decision horizons shorten dramatically during a fiscal crunch,
and any spending category that yields its returns in the future is a likely
victim of political expediency.  To restore the balance in the
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composition of public spending, public sector infrastructure spending,
other public investment, repairs and maintenance and all other public
spending categories that functionally constitute investment (whatever
their official designation) should be favoured when the ‘seven lean
years’ are over and the ‘seven fat years’ arrive.  The reason is simple:
if not then, when? 
When it comes to infrastructure spending, it is again important to
distinguish between the operation and management of the social
overhead capital stock and its financing.  Roads and bridges, for
instance, have some of the properties of a public capital good: up to the
point where congestion sets in, road and bridge use is non-rival
(marginal cost is below average cost).  However, since road and bridge
use are, at a cost, excludable, controlled access roads and bridges can,
though tolls or other forms of road charges, be privately operated and
managed.  With marginal cost below average cost, competitive private
operation is not feasible. Subsidisation and regulation may be required.
Not only is there no automatic case for the government owning and
operating the stock of social overhead capital, but also the financing of
infrastructure investment need not be the sole province of the
sovereign.  Many financial constructs for sharing the risks and returns
to infrastructure investment between public and private sector partners
have been designed and implemented throughout history, and new joint
ventures of this kind are being tried and tested in a variety of economic
and institutional settings.  It is ironic that perhaps the strongest
practical argument for involving the private sector in the financing of
infrastructure investment is that without access to private funds, made
available by private investors with effective decision horizons longer
than those of the government, the public sector alone would be unable
or unwilling to undertake a socially worthwhile investment.  Political
myopia, sometimes institutionalised in myopic public sector budgeting
rules that do not distinguish between current and capital spending
(such as PSBR targets or ceilings) prevents the public sector from
fulfilling its ‘Platonic guardian’ role of overcoming private sector
capital market imperfections (liquidity constraints etc) and enabling the
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economy as a whole to take the long view.  It would surely be sensible
to try to implement political and administrative reforms that encourage
the public sector to make use of its undoubtedly unique potential for
taking the long view, born of its ability to tax current and future
generations and to make use of seigniorage revenues.
Reducing the effective marginal tax rate on capital income
Policies to bring the private rate of return to physical capital formation
more closely in line with the social rate of return include reductions in
the average effective marginal tax rate on capital income and reductions
in the dispersion of the effective marginal tax rate around the average.
Different forms of private capital formation are subject to wildly
different marginal effective tax rates, and most of these differences
cannot be rationalised with reference to externalities or other sources
of differences between private and social rates of return.
VI CONCLUSIONS
Macroeconomic policy during the years to come will have to operate
in a more open, international environment than at any time since the
beginning of World War I.  Macroeconomic policy will also have to
work through, and will be constrained by, markets (domestic and
international) in a way that would be more familiar to the governments
of the Gold Standard days than to governments of the post-World War
II Keynesian era. 
While our expectations of what government can do are more
modest than those at the time of founding of the Bretton Woods
institutions more than 50 years ago, it remains our view that the quality
of the institutions of government and of the policies that it pursues may
well be the single most important factor accounting for differential
economic performance in the medium and long term.  A limited but
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strong state is likely to be a defining characteristic of economic success
in the decades to come.
Macroeconomic stability is one of the key intermediate public
goods that the government alone can provide.  Its effect on the quantity
and quality of private investment is one important channel through
which the government, by stimulating capital formation, broadly
defined, can take advantage of a relatively favourable global economic
environment to lay the groundwork for sustained and shared growth.
This should be complemented with policies to boost saving rates
(especially in the industrial countries); policies to encourage
investment in infrastructure and in environmental capital; policies to
enhance the effective human capital stock through education and
training; measures to raise the active-inactive population ratio; and
policies to add to the stock of human knowledge through research and
development.
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ENDNOTES
1. In the sense that it is non-rival (one person’s ‘consumption’ does
not diminish another’s) and non-excludable (it is not possible to
exclude consumers from using the good).
2. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein (1983), using data
for 17 OECD countries over the 15-year period 1960-1974,
found that the gross national (private plus public) saving-GDP
ratio and the gross domestic capital formation-GDP ratio were
highly positively correlated.  They interpreted this as indicating
a relatively low degree of international capital mobility.  If this
interpretation is correct, sustained (exogenous) increases in the
domestic saving rates would induce approximately equal
increases in domestic investment rates, rather than spilling over
into current account surpluses.  Both the empirical analysis and
the interpretation have been contested. 
3. This holds also for trade in real goods and services.  Gross
inflows and outflows (imports and exports)  matter and not just
the net trade balance.
4. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).  For a detailed discussion of the
recent growth of the international financial markets see Goldstein
and Folkerts-Landau (1994).
5. See eg Schadler et. al. (1993) and Khan and Reinhart (1995).
6. During the days of the gold standard, the international
movements of  both labour and financial capital were subject to
few political barriers.  While political and administrative
obstacles are probably still higher today than they were between
1870 and 1913, the technology of mobility of the 1990s surely
dominates that of the earlier ‘open’ era. 
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7. SOPEMI ‘Trends in International Migration’ Annual Report
1994—1995 edition, OECD.
8. It must be remembered, and it is a major theme of this paper, that
markets do not occur in a vacuum and there are many other
relationships and institutions which are crucial to effective
economic organisation and performance.
9. The first welfare theorem says that any competitive equilibrium
(with complete markets and complete market participation and
without externalities) is a Pareto Optimum.  The second welfare
theorem says that, without externalities and with lump-sum
redistribution (and with appropriate convexity assumptions
concerning production and consumption), any Pareto Optimum
can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. 
10. This controversy revolved around the possibilities of rational and
efficient resource allocation under socialism, or more specifically,
in centrally planned economies with publicly owned means of
production.  See eg von Mises (1920), Hayek (1935), Hayek (ed.)
(1935), Hayek (1945), Wootton (1935), Lange (1938), Lerner
(1944) and Bergson (1948) and Eckstein (ed.) (1971).  Hayek
and von Mises emphasised the role of private ownership in
providing incentives for work, effort, saving and investment and
for revealing economically useful information.  Private ownership
was in their view essential for the price mechanism to aggregate
and disseminate information, thus permitting efficient
decentralised decision making.  Market prices in an economy with
private ownership were therefore fundamentally different from
the shadow prices generated by the (mythical) omniscient central
planner.  Central in Hayek’s theory of informational efficiency
and decentralisation was his emphasis on the universality and
inescapability of bounded rationality, leading him to view the
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market system not as a static resource allocation mechanism but
as a dynamic discovery process.
11. See eg Lin (1992) and Hussain and Stern (1991).
12. See, for example, Burgess and Stern (1993) and IMF (1989).
13. See, for example, the EBRD Transition Report Update, April
1996, and IMF Government Financial Statistics.
14. It would have been more useful to have comparative figures for
developing countries and for some of the NICs, rather than for the
OECD.  However, figures for general government revenues (and
spending) are extremely sparse for non-OECD countries.  Only
central government data tend to be available.  These are not
appropriate for our purposes.
15. See, for example, Hussain and Stern (1991) and Wall Street
Journal, 16 July (1996) (p. 8A)
16. This Section touches on some of the same issues covered at
greater length in the contribution by Stiglitz in Volume 1 (Stiglitz
(1996)).
17. Note that the national accounts classify such activities as public
consumption, which makes only limited economic sense in most
cases.  On the whole, citizens do not consume law and order.
Law and order, however essential, are intermediate public inputs
into the safe and untroubled consumption of marketed goods and
services and leisure.
18. What follows is based largely on Stern (1991).
19. Note that compulsion is applied vis-à-vis the ‘isolated’ individual
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only.  The reluctant tax payer may rationally vote for higher
taxes.
20. Essentially the rate of growth of the economy is fast enough to
absorb service payment on debt.  Government solvency means
that the initial debt plus the present value of expenditure is no
greater than the present value of revenues, including seigniorage.
Under reasonable restrictions on the government’s ability to tax,
this implies an upper bound on the debt to GDP ratio in the long
term.
21. See Appendix 1 for a more precise statement.
22. See Appendix 1.
23.  Like any price change, a change in the interest rate (the reciprocal
of the intertemporal relative price less one) has distributional
consequences. Net lenders (the old, for instance)  will benefit
from an increase in the real rate of interest; net borrowers will be
hurt. 
24. On this see Blanchard and Summers (1985), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1990), Group of Ten (1995), Qureshi (1995).and IMF
(1995c).
25. This is not inconsistent with spending on disability compensation
(and on pensions) having increased sharply in many transition
economies, which have used disability and early retirement as
means of reducing recorded open unemployment.  The
anticipated life-time degree of protection against ill-health,
disability and unemployment-related income declines can fall for
the representative citizen (with the implications for precautionary
saving described above) at the same time that total expenditure on
these three categories increases on a temporary basis.
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26. See, for example, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994a,b, 1995),
Caballero (1991).
27. See Appendix 2.
28. A 10 percentage points higher average annual inflation rate
between 1960 and 1990 was associated with a 0.2 to 0.3
percentage point lower average annual growth rate of real GDP
over the same period.
29. In the popular dissemination of these findings, Barro’s argument
gets rather muddled (Barro (1995b)).  It is, for instance, hard to
make sense of the following sentence: “But while the impact is
not statistically significant when inflation averages less than 15%,
this does not mean lower rates of inflation are costless: the
adverse effect on growth of inflation below 15% is close to the
effect when it is in the higher ranges. (Barro (1995b)”. Even
though the point estimates may be similar, the lack of statistical
significance of the estimate for the low inflation range surely
means that the point estimate should be taken rather less
seriously.  Actually, not only is the point estimate of the
coefficient of growth on inflation statistically insignificant for the
low inflation countries, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient
is smaller for the low inflation countries (-0.016 with a standard
error of 0.035) than for the middle range inflation countries (-
0.037 with a standard error of 0.017) and the high inflation
countries (-0.023 with a standard error of 0.005). Note also that
Barro’s research, which focuses on the  medium- to long-term
relation(s) between inflation and output growth,  has no bearing
on the existence and magnitude of the  ‘sacrifice ratio’ , the
(transitional) output or unemployment cost of achieving a
sustained reduction in the rate of inflation. That is, it tells us
nothing about the existence or absence of  a short-term trade-off
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between inflation and some measure of real economic
performance, such as output or unemployment. Here too,  Barro’s
popularisation of his research findings is only loosely connected
to the actual research: “There is, in other words, no empirical
support for the idea that more inflation must be tolerated to
achieve higher output and unemployment.”(Barro (1995b)). 
30. In Sarel (1996) a non-linear relationship between inflation and
growth is estimated.  The author concludes that there is a
threshold for the inflation rate below which the effect of
inflation on growth is small and insignificant (and may even be
slightly positive) but above which the effect is negative, large
and significant.  The threshold is estimated to be an average
annual rate of inflation of 8%.  Some scepticism about the
reliability of Sarel’s numerical estimates is in order, however.
He considers but a single structural break, rather than multiple
structural breaks (eg stable price level regimes, moderate
inflation regimes, high inflation regimes and hyperinflationary
regimes) or a more general non-linear relationship between
growth and inflation, without a single key discontinuity.  The
results are also affected by the surprising choice of the
logarithm of the rate of inflation as the inflation variable in his
regressions.  As the inflation rate is negative in a small number
of cases, the author is forced to make arbitrary ad-hoc
adjustments to his data.  Taking the logarithm of (1 + the rate
of inflation) as his inflation variable would have avoided this
problem (the price level did not become negative in any of his
observations).
31. See eg Fischer and Modigliani (1978).
32. ‘Shoe leather’ refers to frequent trips to the bank so that as little
money can be held as possible; ‘menu costs’ refers to the
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frequent relabeling of prices in restaurants, etc
33. The term ‘insurance’ is hardly descriptive. A worker gets paid a
contingent benefit (contingent on being unemployed). There is no
experience rating for individual workers and only in some
countries (like the USA) is there (partial) experience rating for
individual firms.  Even in the aggregate, there is no necessary
(actuarial) link between total contributions (by workers and
employers) and total unemployment benefits.
34. Compulsory unemployment insurance can mitigate the adverse
selection problem; it does nothing to reduce the moral hazard
problem.
35. This need not create any tendency towards positive drift in the
public debt-GDP ratio.
36. The countries of operations number 26 from April 1996 with the
joining of Bosnia.
37. See EBRD, Transition Report 1995, Table 2.2, p. 21 and Chart
2.2, p. 23 for the behaviour of the social indicators in the
transition economies , Table 2.1, page 11 and Chart 2.1 for
indicators of progress in transition in the transition economies and
Annex 11.1, pp. 185-186 data on real GDP growth and inflation
in the transition economies.
38. The income per capita of Czechoslovakia at the time was only
about one-third lower than that of France. In these countries
some generational memory of the market is still there.
39. In China collectivisation was initiated in the 1950s and the
agricultural reforms of the ‘household-responsibility’ system
came in the period 1979-83.
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40. Privatisation does not, of course, by itself solve the problems of
management of those enterprises.
41. A recent extreme example of the sort is New Zealand’s Fiscal
Responsibility Act that makes politicians accountable for
economic promises.
42. It seems that it is de facto, rather than de jure independence that
matters (see Bruno, (1994) and Cukierman (1992)).
43. The external primary surplus is the current account surplus minus
net foreign factor income, roughly the sum of the trade surplus
and net transfers from the rest of the world.
44. See, for example Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1994), Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz (1994), and Bosworth, Dornbusch and Laban
(1994)
45. Even if the equilibrium is strictly temporary or momentary.
46. A second surviving feature of its global or systemic role is the
Fund’s participation, and often leadership role, in putting
together financial rescue packages for countries whose financial
troubles are of sufficient magnitude for them to be deemed to
threaten the stability of financial markets generally.  The recent
Mexican crisis is a frequently cited example of this function.
47. If the introduction of the scheme was anticipated by the currently
old during their youth, they would have raised their consumption
while they were young by reducing voluntary private saving or, if
financial markets are efficient, by dissaving.
48. We are assuming a closed economy for simplicity.  In an open
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economy, the stock of net claims on the rest of the world could
be reduced.
49. The scheme is technically a ‘defined-contribution’ scheme.
50. Clearly, moving from a situation in which there is a serious risk
of savings being confiscated or wiped out by hyperinflation to one
in which positive real rates of return can confidently be expected
will boost the saving rate.
51. This is in the (correct) formal sense that the use of the laws of
physics, for example, by one individual does not prevent their use
by another.  Differential availability of knowledge might, of
course, affect the profitability of certain positions but, while
important, that is a different story.
52. Fair, here, is used in the sense of the rising life expectancy
implying a higher present value of benefits than was anticipated
when the schemes were conceived.
53. The cyclical component of unemployment can also be a self-
inflicted wound.  An example is the UK joining the ERM in
October 1990 at an overvalued exchange rate and then having to
follow German interest rates up in the wake of the German
macroeconomic mismanagement of German re-unification after
May 1990.  The UK then aggravated its problems by creating
doubts about its commitment to ERM, thereby adding a
devaluation risk premium to its interest rates.
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APPENDIX 1
The change in the government debt-GDP ratio in period t, ?b(t+1),
equals the initial debt-GDP ratio, b(t),  times the excess of the real
interest rate, r(t+1), over the growth rate of real GDP, g(t+1), minus
the government sector’s primary (non-interest) surplus as a fraction of
GDP,. s(t),  minus seigniorage (new issues of base money) as a fraction
of GDP, s(t) , that is,
Db t
r t g t
g t
b t s t t( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )+ º
+ - +
+ +
æ
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ö
ø
÷ - -1
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s
Note that the debt-GDP ratio declines (?b<0) when s+s>b(r-g)/(1+g).
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APPENDIX 2
Seigniorage (as a share of GDP), denoted s , is the change in the
nominal stock of base money (currency plus commercial bank reserves
with the central bank), expressed as a fraction of GDP.  It represents
the real resources appropriated by the state through its ability to issue
non-interest-bearing base money.  If H denotes the nominal stock of
base money and Y denotes nominal GDP then: 
s º
DH
Y
The inflation tax (as a share of GDP), denoted t p,  is the reduction in
the real value of the outstanding stock of base money due to inflation,
expressed as a fraction of GDP.  If p denotes the rate of inflation, g the
growth rate of real GDP and h/H/Y the base money-GDP ratio, and a
subscript -1 denotes a value in the preceding period, we have:
t pp º -1H
Y
or
The following identity links seigniorage and the inflation tax:
Thus, seigniorage exceeds the inflation tax either if there is growth in
real GDP or when the base money-GDP ratio is increasing (the income
velocity of base money is declining).
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TABLE 1
General Government Revenues in Some Transition Economies
(% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
estimate
Kazakstan 25.0 24.6 22.3 17.7 16.4
Kyrgyz
Republic
35.7 12.7 23.3 21.6 14.5*
Lithuania 41.4 32.1 28.5 24.5 22.4
Russian
Federation
NA 41.7 37.8 33.3 NA
Ukraine 36.5 41.5 41.1 44.3 41.3**
OECD 37.3 37.3 37.6 37.5 37.8
Source: 1991—1992: IMF; 1995: EBRD Transition Report
Update, April 1996
General government includes central, state and local government,
social security funds and off-budget transactions. It does not include
state enterprises.
* Government expenditure and net lending plus government balance.
**State budget revenue. 
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TABLE 2
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES IN THE MAJOR OECD COUNTRIES 1850-1993
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900-13 24-29 30-32 33-39 56-73 74-80 81-93
Nominal Interest Rate
USA 5.1 5.1 5.0 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.4 2.6 4.7 7.9 9.5
Japan 5.6 8.2 6.0
Germany 3.9 4.2 4.3 3.9 3.3 3.7 7.1 9.3 5.2 7.0 7.8 7.7
France 4.5 4.4 4.7 3.7 3.0 3.3 5.1 3.6 4.2 6.6 11.1 11.2
UK 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.5 3.1 4.5 4.3 3.2 6.9 13.3 10.5
Italy 5.7 5.0 4.6 5.9 12.6 13.6
Canada 3.8 4.7 4.8 3.5 5.8 9.7 10.9
4 country avg* 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.5 3.1 3.5 5.1 5.1 3.8 6.3 10.0 9.7
Real Interest Rate
USA 4.3 1.7 7.6 5.2 5.4 2.3 3.6 11.5 1.1 1.1 -0.3 5.6
Japan 0.3 0.5 4.4
Germany 1.8 3.3 3.6 3.8 2.9 3.5 5.3 17.1 4.9 3.0 3.0 4.5
France 2.0 4.7 5.1 3.8 3.8 1.8 0.2 7.1 -1.2 1.0 0.4 5.7
UK 1.8 2.8 3.2 3.7 1.9 2.7 5.5 6.4 2.1 1.8 -3.3 4.5
Italy 5.7 12.7 0.4 1.1 -5.0 4.2
Canada 1.6 4.9 10.0 1.8 2.2 0.3 6.7
4 country avg* 2.5 3.1 4.9 4.1 3.5 2.6 3.7 10.5 1.7 1.7 0.0 5.1
GDP Growth Rate
USA 3.2 3.1 6.2 3.7 4.5 4.1 3.5 -11.1 4.9 3.5 2.1 2.6
Japan 9.1 3.6 3.6
Germany 2.6 2.1 2.1 3.3 2.7 3.5 2.4 -7.1 10.6 4.7 2.2 1.8
France 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.1 1.6 3.4 -5.3 2.0 5.2 2.8 1.8
UK 2.2 3.0 1.8 1.3 2.1 1.7 2.3 -1.7 3.7 2.8 1.0 1.9
Italy 3.0 -1.0 3.4 5.2 2.9 1.8
Canada 5.1 6.1 -8.9 7.7 5.1 3.8 2.4
4 country avg* 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 -6.3 5.3 4.1 2.0 2.1
Interest Rate - Growth Rate
USA 1.1 -1.4 1.4 1.5 0.9 -1.9 0.2 22.5 -3.8 -2.4 -2.4 3.0
Japan -8.8 -3.1 0.7
Germany -0.7 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 2.9 24.2 -5.8 -1.7 0.8 2.7
France 0.7 2.9 4.1 2.4 1.8 0.2 -3.3 12.4 -3.2 -4.3 -2.4 3.9
UK -0.4 -0.2 1.3 2.4 -0.2 1.0 3.2 8.1 -1.6 -1.0 -4.3 2.6
Italy 2.7 13.7 -3.0 -4.1 -7.8 2.4
Canada -3.5 -1.2 18.9 -5.9 -2.8 -3.5 4.3
4 country avg* 0.2 0.6 2.1 1.7 0.7 -0.2 0.8 16.8 -3.6 -2.3 -2.1 3.0
Source:  OECD Historical Statistics for 1966-1990; OECD Main Economic Indicators and OECE National Accounts,
supplemented as required by data on interest rates from Homer (1991).
Pre-World War II data on interest rates are from Homer (1991); pre-World War II data on GDP and prices are from
Mitchell (1992) and Mitchell (1993).
Conversion to real terms is based on the GDP deflator.
*4 country average - USA, Germany, France, UK.
.
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TABLE 3  
Some Macroeconomic Characteristics of Fast and Slow Growers
(1960—1989)
Fast
Growers
Slow
Growers
t- statistic
Inflation rate 12% 31% -1.7
Black market 
exchange rate
premium
14% 57% -3.8
Investment/GDP 23% 17% 5.2
Export/GDP 32% 23% 2.3
Source: Levine and Renelt (1992, Table 3).  
Sample of 109 countries; fast growers are the 56 countries whose
growth rate of pre-capita income exceeds the mean; slow growers are
the remaining 53 countries.
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TABLE 4
Progress in Transition and Macroeconomic Performance
(measured by the median of each group)
Private Score on Score Score Score Government Cumulative Decline Annual Ratio of GDP Increase
Sector enterprise on on on Fiscal balance (1989-93) in Inflation lowest growth in infant
GDP share restructuring markets' BankingInvestment in 1995 Fiscal Revenues Rate registered GDP % mortality
% & privatisation liberaisation Reform Laws % of GDP % of GDP % to 1989 GDP 1995 rate %
a/ a/ a/ a/ a) d/ b/ 1992 1995 b/ a/ c/
Advanced transition countries 60 3.7 3.3 3 3 -1 -5 93 22 76 5 -15
Intermediate transition countries 42 2.7 2.8 2 2 -7 -20 237 28 65 0 7
Early transition countries 27 2 2.3 1.8 2 -4 -18 1364 125 49 -5 15.6
a/ Source: ‘Transition Report 1995', pp. 11, 185, 186, EBRD.   The qualitative
index of reform in columns 2 to 6 ranges from 1 to 4*, with 4* classed as 5
when medians were calculated.  Most advanced industrial economies would
qualify for the 4* rating for almost all of these indicators in the qualitative
index of reform.  1 indicates negligible change from the old position.
b/ Source: de Melo et al., World Bank, 1995
c/  Source: ‘Crisis in Mortality, Health and Nutrition’, p.6, UNICEF.
d/ Projection. It excludes the Central Bank quasi-fiscal deficits. Cash balances
used when other figures not available. Data not available for Tadjikistan,
Belarus, Turkmenistan. 
Note: The groups include:
(i) Advanced Transition (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia)
(ii) Intermediate Transition (Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan,
Romania, Russian Federation)
(iii) Early Transition (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan)
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Chart  1  Foreign direct investment and transition level
25 countries in transition
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Note: Each point reflects the number of investments in a country that had been undertaken by the companies in the survey, divided by
population size (in millions), and the average of six scores that a country received in different areas of reform.
Source: EBRD (1995, 1996)
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Note: Each point reflects the number of investments in a country that had been undertaken by the companies in the survey, divided by the
population size (in millions), and the logarithm of the rate of inflation.
Chart  2  Relation between inflation and foreign direct investment
25 countries in transition
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CHART 3
Prototype Path of Monthly Inflation in Transition Economies: Before and After Reform Breakthrougha
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CHART 4
Prototype Path of Annual Real GDP Growth in Transition Economies: Before and After Reform
Breakthrougha
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Source: De Melo et al (1995)
a/ Data for 25 countries of operation of EBRD, plus Mongolia.  Results come from an statistical method
known as ‘switching regime regression’.  The breakthrough is defined as the year in which a specific
country has reached a set of transition indicators comparable to those of Poland as of 1990.
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